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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
There is a growing concern around new patterns of negotiating international 
investment agreements vis-a-vis the recent withdrawals from Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) by developing countries. In recent times, the decision by a number of 
countries withdrawing their BITs with their investment partners raises questions to 
whether this investment instrument remains relevant in international investment 
discourse, 1or simply creates a gap to be exploited by larger entities or economies.  
The emergence of BITs became increasingly important within the framework of 
International Investment Law when emerging nations acceded to be members of the 
international community after World War II.2 Literature contends that emerging nations 
had little evidence to show that BITs have stimulated additional investments in 
developing countries, let alone revitalised domestic reforms during this era.3 
Seemingly, these conditions are not peculiar to certain countries but cut across 
geographical regions.  
The call for Investment Treaties can be seen from two perspectives. One, is from the 
Investor’s point of view to engage its home country in fostering a bilateral agreement 
with other countries and secondly from the host country seeking developments by 
means of capital investments from bigger economies. One can then suggest that the 
need for investment treaties is primarily driven by the host country, in this case a 
developing state, while on the other hand, these treaties facilitates the quest to meet 
the needs of developed states in fulfilling the new international economic order.4 In 
view of these developments, it is imperative for developed nations to protect their 
                                                                 
1 Cervantes-Knox K & Thomas E ‘Ecuador terminates 12 BITs - growing trend of reconsideration of 
traditional investment treaties? (2017) DLA PIPER 1 available at 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/southafrica/insights/publications/2017/05/ecuador -terminates-12-bits-a-
growing-trend/ accessed 16 June 2018). 
2 Salacuse J W The Law of Investment Treaties (2010) 75. 
3 Hallward-Driemeier M ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties attract FDI? Only a bit…and they could bite’ 
World Bank  (2003) 22 available at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/113541468761706209/105505322_20041117160010/addi
tional/multi0page.pdf (accessed 16 June 2018).  
4Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment (2010) 173. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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investments by initiating legal frameworks guided by Customary International Law as 
a pre-emptive measure to guard against political and other associated risk.5 
For the purpose of this mini-thesis, this research aims to establish the importance of 
the current formulation of African BITs in relation to protecting and promoting 
investment for both investor and host country. These BITs will be compared to the 
South African Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015,6 to establish if they are 
designed conclusively for the purpose of investment protection and promotion while 
preserving the bilateral relationships. Recommendations will be suggested as to the 
best way forward for African countries with regards to developing sustainable bilateral 
agreements. The primary focus will be on protection and promotion clauses in the 
selected BITs while occasionally discussing provisions of dispute settlement as they 
arise within specific case studies. Dispute settlement mechanisms will remain part of 
the concluding arguments.  
First, the notion of International Investment Agreements (IIAs) must be understood. 
The IIA is a product of international investment law, a legal framework that is 
continuously undergoing remarkable transformation over time.7 More conspicuously, 
the IIA is a legal instrument designed to help policy makers, government officials and 
other stakeholders frame rules guiding international investments for the purpose of 
fostering sustainable developments and inclusive growth.8  
The continuous use of IIAs to promote and protect investment among nations cannot 
be overemphasised. Nevertheless, deriving the appropriate methodology to measure 
the extent to which investments are protected might be difficult or almost impossible 
to achieve.9 Common clauses used in safeguarding investments in BITs include the 
protection of private investments made by individuals/entities, protection against 
expropriation, fair and equitable treatment (FET), transfer of funds as well as other 
                                                                 
5 Sornarajah M (2010) 174. 
6 Act No 22 of 2015 Protection of Investment Act 2015 available at 
https://www.thedti.gov.za/business_regulation/acts/Investment_Act_22of2015.pdf  (accessed 17 June 
2018). 
7 Salacuse J W & Sullivan N P ‘Do BITs really work? An evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
their grand bargain’ (2005) 46 HILJ 67. 
8 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/International -
Investment-Agreements-(IIAs).aspx (accessed 17 June 2018). 
9 Salacuse J W (2010) 118. 
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obligations.10 These instruments do not work in isolation, but with collaborative 
investors’ commitments through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  
Foreign Direct Investment growth from the perspective of developing nations builds 
the framework for expediting developments and economic opportunities.11 A 
remarkable example is the investment in renewable energy by the South African 
Government which has yielded exponential benefits in skills development in 
technology to the economy.12 It should be known that FDI is not the panacea for 
achieving all socio-economic developments but only a means to an end and not a goal 
in itself.13  
Succinctly, in spite of these anticipated successes, there are always tendencies for 
dispute processes to be initiated. Providing an effective mechanism to handle such 
grievances remains the responsibility of the intended legal agreement. Such 
agreements must clearly state guidelines on the dispute settlement and compliance. 
Compliance to these sets of rules of conduct are high when mutual benefits are met, 
however, a denial of such benefits will attract sanctions which are enforced by the 
agreed dispute settlement mechanism (DSM).14 In situations where targeted 
objectives don’t meet desired goals of investors, investors are known to have instituted 
dispute settlement measures against host states. For instance, in the SSP v EGYPT15 
case, the tribunal concluded that the primacy of the foreign investment was paramount 
thus, the government was held liable for breaching the contract.16 
Poulsen argues that countries sacrificed their sovereignty unknowingly in the quest for 
development only to realise the extent of damage when claims are brought against 
them by investors.17 This leads to more questions as to why BITs were created. Were 
                                                                 
10 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) available at 
http://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=371540&p=4187393 (accessed 17 June 2018). 
11 Carlos M C & Nagesh K Protecting foreign investment (2003) 13. 
12 Samuels C ‘The dark side of foreign direct investment: A South African perspective’ SAIIA (2013) 5 
available at http://www.saiia.org.za/occasional -papers/the-dark-side-of-foreign-direct-investment -a-
south-african-perspective (accessed 17 June 2018). 
13 Samuels C (2013) 18.  
14 Sornarajah M ‘The clash of globalisations and the international law on foreign investment’ (2003) 10:2 
Canadian foreign policy journal 6. 
15 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt , ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/3. 
16 Sornarajah M (2003) 9. 
17 Poulsen L N S Sacrificing sovereignty by chance: Investment treaties developing countries and 
bounded rationality (PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011) 3 available 
at http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/141/1/Poulsen_Sacrificing_sovereignty_by_chance.pdf (accessed 18 
August 2018).  
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they created as an alternative to diplomatic protection or were they established as 
international investment instruments of law to protect, promote and retain the sanctity 
existing investments? The answers to this hypothesis will probably be open ended, 
notably because there are no direct claims in literature to link FDI and BITs suggesting 
that without BITs developing counties will lose FDI.18 It is a combination of various 
additional factors which needs to be tested to establish its exclusivity. This will be 
covered in chapter two.   
Recent developments suggest that South Africa, Ecuador and Indonesia are 
recalling/withdrawing from their BITs for reconsideration and renegotiation.19 Attesting 
to this are comments from the Secretary General of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) who suggested:  
‘Government and business leaders are also seeking to reform treaties so as  to ensure 
that they help attract investment, not litigation. Some major countries such as South 
Africa, Indonesia and India are terminating, reconsidering or updating what they 
perceive to be outdated treaties that excessively curtail their “policy space” and entail 
unacceptable legal risk’.20 
This assertion by the Secretary General strongly suggest that investment treaties are 
less attractive to developing states inter alia African states. South Africa is among the 
first in Africa to withdraw its BITs.21 The introduction of the Protection of Investment 
Act 22 of 2015 as a replacement to BITs is a reflection of a sustainable option by the 
South African government however it is yet to be comprehensively examined for its 
effectiveness to investments.22  
Establishment of protection of investment in Africa has prompted the expansion of 
BITs among sovereign states. The expansions are by and large as a result of 
multinational companies trying to secure their investment in developing countries 
through legal frameworks designed to facilitate and protect their investment.23 By 
                                                                 
18 Poulsen L N S (2011) 23. 
19 Angel Gurria Secretary General of OECD ‘The growing pains of investment treaties’ (2014) available 
at http://oecdinsights.org/2014/10/13/the-growing-pains-of-investment -treaties/ (accessed 18 June 
2018). 
20 Angel Gurria Secretary General of OECD (2014). 
21 Angel Gurria Secretary General of OECD (2014). 
22 Schlemmer E C ‘An Overview of South Africa’s Bilateral Investment Treaties and Investment Policy’ 
(2016) ICSID Review 185. 
23 Salacuse J W (2010) 95. 
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designing a robust and vibrant legal frameworks with clear and enforceable rules to 
govern foreign investments, the general assumption is that foreign investments are 
protected.24 The same assumption further argues that while protected, risk are 
reduced and a reduction of risk promotes investments.25 
As a prerequisite to developments, African countries are forced into signing 
agreements that include clauses that might be detrimental to their sovereignty as 
independent states.26 However, there are no binding obligations to encourage or 
induce nationals to invest in territories of their BIT counterparts.27 This research will 
also explore the provisions of recent African BITs by trying to unpack the 
interpretations of protection of investment clauses such as Fair and Equitable 
Treatment (FET), National Treatment (NT), Most Favoured Nation (MFN), Full 
Protection and Security (FPS), expropriation and compensation, transfer as well as 
dispute settlement mechanism while proposing viable alternatives to an efficient BIT 
framework.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Generally, BITs to an extent highlight the window of opportunities to any given state 
at any given time by providing an insight into investment possibilities through its 
provisions. While it remains an exclusive document of bilateral commitments, it can be 
assumed that these legal instruments are inherently responsible for the control of 
people, actions and objects within its territory.28 Having said that, with the constant 
change and continuous evolvement of society, it is necessary to evaluate how 
important this instrument is to the protection and promotion of investment in Africa.  
The conditions under which most IIAs were established have changed over time hence 
the need for new approaches cannot be overemphasised. In achieving this arduous 
objective, this thesis will explore the provisions of selected African BITs to establish if 
they have experienced significant changes in their respective legislative framework or 
if new models have emerged to address the concerns of African States. The fact that 
Africa is mostly on the receiving end of financial investment suggest that before FDI 
                                                                 
24 Salacuse J W & Sullivan N P (2005) 95. 
25 Salacuse J W & Sullivan N P (2005) 95. 
26 Schlemmer E C (2016) 168 
27 Salacuse J W & Sullivan N P (2005) 95. 
28 Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment fourth edition (2017) 145. 
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are initiated, certain conditions must be met. Those conditions will be discussed to 
establish the importance of BITs as a tool for protection and promotion of investment 
in the new age. The new age represents an era of complex industrialisation often 
referred to as the fourth industrial revolution,29 characterised by exponential changes 
designed to meet the challenges of the 21st century.30 Are BITs actively designed to 
meet these challenges or are they merely tools with exploitative indicators for judicial 
recourse? Answers to this questions form the basis of the investigation. 
1.3 Significance of Study 
 
The decision on whether to withdraw or uphold the BIT agreements remains the 
prerogative of the sovereign states in question. The manner in which the state will 
design its agreements will depend on what benefit it seeks from the proposed 
relationship. 
The significance of this study is to analyse the scope of the treaties and to assess if 
they fulfil the purpose for which they were established. In addition, this thesis will 
highlight the importance of the BITs in fostering international bilateral relationships. 
Are they truly a means to an end or an end in itself towards development in Africa? In 
order to establish this, questions as to whether BITs are merely tools used by investors 
to exploit host nations or if they are concluded to preserve the sanctity of the protected 
agreement are to be considered.  
Furthermore, it is in the best interest of the host country to take into consideration the 
interest of the foreign investor as customary international law requires that these 
interests must be protected.31 For that reason, it is incumbent on the BITs to strike an 
intrinsic balance between protecting investors’ interest and that of the host state.  This 
thesis seeks to investigate the primary function of BITs from the African perspective, 
with respect to protecting and promoting investment in selected African BITs. Selected 
provisions will be identified to give a better understanding on the technicalities of 
                                                                 
29 Bloem J et al ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution: Things to tighten the link between IT and OT’ available 
at https://vint.sogeti.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/VINT-Sogeti-Internet-of-Things-Report-3.pdf  
(accessed 28 March 2019). This concept aptly describes a rapid and fundamental change in industrial 
development, notably from being industrious to being industrial. I.e. the time line of industrialisation has 
moved from Mechanical Production- Mass Production-Electronic and IT- Cyber and Physical growth. 
30 See page 4 which describes the fourth industrial revolution as a paradigm shift in industry from real 
manufacturing to digital manufacturing. 
31 Sornarajah M (2017) 146. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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conceptualising the text of these clauses while suggesting ways of improving the 
agreements to be aligned with the interest of African States. 
Salacuse & Sullivan questioned why developing countries enter into IIAs knowing the 
limitations it exerts on the sovereignty of the state?32 They concluded by arguing that 
developing countries deem it necessary to promote the increase in capital inflow as 
well as technological knowhow in their territories.33 If this assumption is correct, then 
BITs in its present approach should be an instrument for collective benefits between 
investor and host state and not a case of preferential benefits to protect the investors’ 
interest mostly.  
In view of the above proposition, African countries by and large should enjoy the 
benefits of these agreements without the fear of exploitations from their investors. The 
general idea is that the bilateral treaties aim at protecting and facilitating investme nt 
opportunities while reducing the risk of investors however questions as to whether it 
creates gaps that constrains the host country remains contentious in investment law.  
The answers to this will suggest a framework for future approaches in formulating  
international investment agreements. The basis for these frameworks should be based 
on policies which seeks to further the commercial interest and national 
competitiveness of African countries.34 In contextualising this agreement, this research 
will give clarity on more acceptable approaches in protecting investor – host country 
interest in a manner that is mutually beneficial. 
1.4 Research Question and Objectives 
 
The objective of this research is to determine the fundamental importance of BITs in 
relation to the protection and promotion of investment in Africa. Based on the problems 
articulated earlier, the thesis will put into consideration certain clauses in selected BITs 
and determining if they satisfy the adequacy need for both investor and host country 
or otherwise. The following questions to be answered are as follows; 
 
                                                                 
32 Salacuse J W & Sullivan N P (2005) 77. 
33 Salacuse J W & Sullivan N P (2005) 77. 
34 Carlos M C & Nagesh K Protecting foreign investment (2003) 9. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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I. To what extent does the provisions on ‘Protection and Promotion of 
Investment’ clauses go to include a balance of interests between the investor 
and host state in selected African BITs?  
II. What has the South African Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015 done 
differently to protect new investments in the country? Questions as to why 
this Act was promulgated and if its adoption is beneficial to the country in the 
long run will be addressed.  
III.  After evaluation of the uniqueness of the selected African BITs and the South 
African Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015, do the identified approaches 
seek to address the anticipated needs of both the Investor and host country 
considering their legislative formations? Are the dispute settlement clauses 
provided in both approaches appropriate to address the needs of both 
contracting parties? 
IV. To make recommendations based on the observations on the most effective 
ways of protecting and promoting investments in Africa. Is the present status 
quo worth retaining?  
1.5 Methodology 
 
This research will be a desktop study. All materials used will be sourced from the 
library as well as the internet. Primary sources will include literature from UNCTAD, 
UNCITRAL, ICSID, current BITs of various African countries, South Africa Protection 
of Investment Act 22 of 2015, as well as Section 25 of the constitution of South Africa 
which the parliament is currently reassessing for amendments. Although not the main 
purpose of this thesis, it is noteworthy to give an insight on recent deliberations with 
regards to ‘expropriation of land’ and its attendant effect on South African legislation. 
The choice to analyse these BITs stems from the fact that they all adopt different 
approaches in defining ‘Protection and Promotion of Investment’ and are from three 
geo-political regions in Africa. The choice of vocabulary used and the applicability will 
depend on the interpretation from contracting parties. On the other hand, the SA 
Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015 was designed in a specific manner to address 
protection and the expropriation clauses. This raises interesting questions as to the 
present clamour for amendments of Section 25 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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Secondary sources will include books, journal articles, news opinions and other 
credible scholarly materials needed to achieve this goal. 
1.6 Chapter Outline 
 
This research is divided into (5) chapters 
Chapter 1 
This chapter introduces the mini thesis. It consists of the background to the research, 
research question and objectives, significance of the problem, methodology, key 
definitions and the chapter outline. 
Chapter 2 
This chapter examines the ‘Protection and Promotion of Investment’ clauses as found 
in current African BITs namely Morocco – Nigeria (2016), Japan- Kenya (2016) and 
Canada – Senegal (2014).35 It further scrutinises the provisions of the selected African 
BITs including the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) as enshrined in the BITs and 
seeks to establish if they serve the interest of both investor and host nation considering 
the African perspective. 
Chapter 3 
Chapter three aims to establish if the SA Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015 
addresses the concerns of investors with regards to protecting Investments. The 
research will narrowly explore the provisions of Section 25 of the constitution of South 
Africa,36 the provisions on dispute settlement and discuss not extensively the effect of 
expropriation of land which is subject to amendments by parliament and its attendant 
effect on investments. 
Chapter 4 
The author performs a selected comparative study between the selected African BITs 
and the SA POI Act by comparing the provisions on protection and promotion of 
                                                                 
35 International Investment Agreement Navigator available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/MostRecentTreaties#iiaInnerMenu (accessed 08 August 
2018). 
36 Bill of Rights Section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf (accessed 07 August  
2018). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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investments. The Dispute Settlement mechanisms adopted by both approaches are 
also discussed. The investigation discusses these approaches in line with the 
requirements of customary international law and closely considers if elements of both 
approaches suits the legislative framework of the African state. 
Chapter 5 
This chapter further concludes the mini-thesis with suggested recommendations on 
most effective methods for promoting and protecting investments in Africa, taking into 
consideration the importance of BITs. Final remarks suggest strategies for future BITs. 
1.7 Key Definitions 
 
This research focuses mainly on the promotion and protection of investment in Africa. 
Key definitions within this discourse includes: 
Foreign Direct Investments as defined by Sornarajah ‘Involves the transfer of 
tangible and intangible assets from one country to another for the purpose of their use 
in that country to generate wealth under the total or partial control of the owner of the 
asset.’37 
Bilateral Investment Treaties are treaties that ‘Involve two states often a capital- 
exporting [developed] and a capital-importing [developing] state dealing exclusively 
with investment issues and providing substantive promises of favourable treatment.’ 38 
Vandevelde further characterises BITs as ‘Advertising themselves as instrument of 
liberalisation.’39 
International Investment Agreements are legal instruments designed to help policy 
makers, government officials and other stakeholders frame rules guiding international 
investments for the purpose of fostering sustainable developments and inclusive 
                                                                 
37 Sornarajah M (2010) 8. 
38 Yackee J W (2011) 402. 
39 Vandevelde K J ‘Investment Liberalisation and Economic Development: The role of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’ (1998) 36:501 Columbia journal of transnational law 503.The liberalisation theory  
is based on the premise that BITs are’ instrument for the facilitation and protection of international 
investment flow’. The efficiency of the free market is determined by the effective use of its resources 
and productive capacity. 
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growth.40 E.g. Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN), Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (BIT), North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)41 amongst others. 
South African Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015 is a piece of legislation 
passed as an Act of Parliament on the 15 December 2015 to provide for the protection 
of investors and their investments in achieving a balance of rights and obligations that 
apply to all investors and to provide for matters connected therewith in the Act. The 
Act came into effect on the 13th July 2018.42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
40 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/International -
Investment-Agreements-(IIAs).aspx (accessed 17 June 2018). 
41 Vandevelde K J ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreement’ (2005) 12 University of 
California Davies Journal of International Law and Policy 181. 
42 South African Government Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015 available at 
https://www.gov.za/documents/protection-investment -act-22-2015-15-dec-2015-0000 (accessed 12 
April 2019). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AN ANALYSIS OF PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF INVESTMENT 
CLAUSES IN SELECTED AFRICAN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the Promotion and Protection of Investment clauses as found 
in selected BITs. As such, the relevant characteristics of selected African BITs will be 
carefully evaluated. The treaties to be considered are those most recently signed 
between selected African countries with other developed nations in other continents. 
They include among others, BITs between Morocco – Nigeria (2016), Japan – Kenya 
(2016) and Canada – Senegal (2014).43 The above mentioned BITs will be analysed 
on the basis of their individual legislative frameworks as defined by the agreements. 
The aim of this analysis is to establish the importance of protecting and promoting 
investments through the designated clauses in the selected BITs and to examine the 
importance of these treaties to investment developments in Africa.  
2.2 Importance of BITs 
 
Earlier in this research, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) were described within the 
scope of protecting investment interests and achieving developmental goals.44 It was 
further defined as a catalyst to investments bringing together shared interest of 
emerging states at a time when a transition of the international regulation of foreign 
investment were most needed.45 
An interesting and more elaborate definition describes these treaties as instruments 
of foreign investments designed within the international legal framework to conduct 
the policy, actions and affairs of the nationals of one country in the territory of 
another.46 These state actions and conduct are autonomously directed towards an 
                                                                 
43 UNCTAD International Investment Agreement Navigator available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/MostRecentTreaties#iiaInnerMenu (accessed 08 August  
2018). 
44 Sornarajah M (2017) 215. 
45 Guzman A T ‘Why LDCs sign treaties that hurt them: Explaining the popularity of Bilateral Investment  
Treaties’ (1998) 38:639 Berkeley law scholarship repository 641. 
46 Salacuse J W The Law of Investment Treaties (2010) 91. 
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anticipated quest for sustainable development. Commentators like Gazzini argue that 
while sustainable development remains a highly controversial paradigm, it serves to 
marry economic development and environmental protection.47 In describing BITs as a 
contributing element to sustainable development, Gazzini echoed that for sustainable 
development to thrive, factors such as the efficient use of natural resources, the 
principle of equity and poverty eradication, principle of human rights and preservation 
of the ecosystem, principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, principle of 
good governance, public participation and access to information and justice, principle 
of integration and interrelationships must be upheld.48  
A holistic view of the above mentioned factors suggest that BITs are progressive 
elements with specific functions of protecting and promoting investment in their 
respective clusters. Concluding BITs henceforth, will depend on how efficiently the 
parties in agreement synthesizes these factors into a unifying legislative framework 
for the overall benefit of all in their respective treaty. 
Determining the impact of BIT at this stage seems premature however it is important 
to note that various factors not exclusive to BITs, contributes to stimulating economic 
developments. Gazzini argues that it will be a misconception to establish a single 
contributing factor for developments to BITs but to an array of other factors ranging 
from other legal instruments like contracts and legislation and other endogenous and 
exogenous factors49 such as technological knowhow, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
natural resources and political neutrality. 
Wandrag opined that in the absence of global regulation, a sizeable number of FDI 
are regulated by BITs and International Investment Agreements (IIAs).50 Thus 
monitoring, evaluation and assessment of FDI’s are also performed by other 
international legal instruments. While the presence of these legal instruments 
contributes to the growth of FDI, the treatment standards enshrined in these 
documents provides for the foreign investors rights to be protected.51  
                                                                 
47 Gazzini T ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and Sustainable Development’ (2014) 15 The Journal of 
World Investment and Trade 932. 
48 Gazzini (2014) 931. 
49 Gazzini (2014) 934. 
50 Trade and Investment Policy Workshop (2015) available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-
meeting/21187/ (accessed 04 March 2019). 
51 See Wandrags comments on treatment standards for foreign investors in ‘Trade and Investment  
Policy Workshop 2015.’ 
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As presented by various scholars, it can be summarised that BITs serve three primary 
functions. First, they are legal instruments for ‘protecting’ investment interest in 
sovereign states including foreign investment.52 Secondly, they are tools for 
‘promoting’ shared interest of countries inter alia harmonising each other bilateral 
interest as the case may be,53 and finally, they are ‘legal documents’ indicating the 
conduct of business, policies and actions of nationals or institutions in each other’s 
territories respectively.54 The emphasis on these descriptions therefore, reckons that 
BITs protect, promote and are legally cushioned in accordance with customary 
international law. 
In addition to these anticipated functions BIT serves, it also provides a platform for 
arbitration where violations have taken place.55 This is considered one of the most 
important functions of the treaty. Aggrieved investors can lodge claims directly against 
host authorities in an investor – state arbitration process where there are violations of 
the BITs.56  
Over the years, in order for host countries to respect the standards of the treaty, the 
investor – state arbitration served as a watch dog towards malicious state behaviour 
against investors.57 The establishment of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 1966 under the auspices of the World Bank (WB) 
guaranteed that enforcement of BITs provisions are adhered to.58 The institution 
embarked on resolving disputes that arose between foreign investors and host 
governments because it was generally accepted that such issues derail the process 
of economic development in least developed countries (LDC’s).59 
Unlike the old customary international law which relied on the ‘Hull rule’60 in providing 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation, the investor –state arbitration accords 
investors a platform to negotiate superior protections against hostile states in a 
                                                                 
52 Sornarajah M (2017) 215. 
53 Guzman A T (1998) 641. 
54 Salacuse J W (2010) 91. 
55Salacuse J W (2010) 92. 
56 Salacuse J W (2010) 92. 
57 Salacuse J W (2010) 93. 
58 Salacuse J W (2010) 93. 
59 Salacuse J W (2010) 93.  
60 Sornarajah M (2017) 153. Hull rule also known as Hull Formula expresses compensation as a result 
of expropriation of private property to be prompt, adequate and effective in execution.  
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properly managed legal process.61 Contrarily, alternative opinion suggest that what 
constitute an effective arbitration process will depend on the parameters prescribed in 
the treaty. For example, the South African Protection of Investment Act (SA POI) 
Section 13 (4) recommends exhaustion of local remedies through a competent legal 
institution in the Republic62 before invoking arbitration between the home state of the 
investor and the host state.63 An in-depth study on dispute settlement will highlight 
various strategies in the African BITs and the SA POI Act in the forthcoming chapters.  
Following the above perspective given by various scholars on the importance of BITs, 
it is apparent that BITs still provide some form of guidance towards understanding a 
country’s position to international investments and its future ambitions. The challenge 
however, is determining the content of the treaties, bearing in mind the contending 
issues of protection and promotion of investments in sovereign nations, the 
overwhelming interest of investors and their investment in finding solutions to the 
challenges of the fourth industrial revolution of recent times. In order to get a general 
understanding of these international legal instrument, investment will be defined in the  
context of each selected African BIT. 
2.3. Investment defined in the context of selected BITs 
 
The term ‘investment’ as covered by most BITs is broadly defined along asset based 
definitions.64 Before concluding on different approaches to the definitions of 
investment, it is important to distinguish between FDI and Portfolio investment. 
Sornarajah defines FDI as the ‘transfer of tangible or intangible assets from one 
country to another for purpose of their use in that country to generate wealth under 
total or partial control of investor.’65 Interestingly, the qualifying word ‘control’ which is 
directly linked to BITs forms the basis of how much the investor or state can regulate. 
Portfolio investment involves a transactional movement of funds for the purpose of 
acquiring right of ownership by means of purchasing shares/security from a legal entity 
                                                                 
61 Guzman A T ‘Why LDCs sign treaties that hurt them: Explaining the popularity of Bilateral Investment  
Treaties’ (1998) 38:639 Berkeley law scholarship repository 644. 
62 Section 13 (4) of Act No 22 of 2015. 
63 Section 13 (5) of Act No 22 of 2015. 
64 Sornarajah M (2017) 11. 
65 Sornarajah M (2017) 11. 
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(company) operating in a foreign country.66 Sornarajah’s definition is limited in scope 
by subjecting portfolio investment to buying of shares in a foreign country however, 
these shares can also be bought in a home country as an investment.  
Al-Louzi articulated the same ideology by dissecting the definition from three different 
angles. First is the asset-based paradigm which defines investment in terms of the 
nature of assets that is tangible and intangible properties.67 These will include 
property, intellectual property, contractual and administrative, direct and portfolio 
investment.68 Secondly is the transaction-based narrative from the angle of transfer of 
cross border financial flow and thirdly the enterprise-based definition which seeks to 
focus on managerial control of enterprises from an investor point of view.69  
This brings the argument to what the distinguishing factors are between FDI and 
Portfolio Investment in relation to customary international law. Customary International 
Law does not cover portfolio investment but classified it under ordinary commercial 
risk, a category attached to the risk profile of the investment during purchase.70 
Nevertheless, the distinguishing factors that separates both definitions are the duration 
of investment, physical presence of investment and the control or management of the 
investment. For the purpose of this thesis, the discussion will focus on FDI as a 
contributing factor to investment which is protected under customary international 
law.71 
Recent developments have shown evidence of portfolio investment included in the 
scope of investments however the level of protection accorded will depend specifically 
on the inclusiveness of certain elements in the definition of investment in respective 
treaty.72 Article 1 of the Japan-Kenya (2016) BIT defines investment as; 
                                                                 
66 Sornarajah M (2017) 11. 
67 Al-Louzi R ‘A Coherent Review of Investment Protection under Bilateral Investment Treaties and Free 
Trade Agreements’ (2015) 12 Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 275. 
68 Al-Louzi R (2015) 275. 
69 Al-Louzi R (2015) 275. 
70 Sornarajah M (2017) 12. 
71 Sornarajah M (2017) 20. 
72 Sornarajah M (2017) 13. 
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‘every kind of asset owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by an investor and has 
characteristics of an investment such as commitment of capital or other resources, the 
expectation of gain or profit, or assumption of risk, including… .’73 
As earlier indicated, the inclusion of Portfolio Investment have become a major 
characteristic of modern treaties in recent times.74 Both treaties under scrutiny namely 
Canada-Senegal (2014), Morocco-Nigeria (2016) follows the same pattern by listing 
the different characteristics of investments as elements of investment covered in their 
respective treaty. While unpacking what constitutes investment, Sornarajah concluded 
that the task of defining the parameters of investments remains the duty of the host 
state in categorising what is tangible and intangible and the rights to its existence 
which is purely vested in the law of the state where the investment is incorporated.75 
For instance, the Canada-Senegal (2014) BIT classifies investments under its Article 
1 as;  
‘an enterprise, a share, stock or other form of equity participation in an enterprise,…any 
other tangible or intangible, moveable or immoveable, property and related property 
rights acquired in the expectation of or used for the purpose of economic benefit or 
other business purpose’.76 
On the other hand, while the definition of investment is consistent with some elements 
of portfolio investment, the Morocco-Nigeria (2016) BIT excludes portfolio investment 
as investment however identified certain characteristics consistent with portfolio 
investment included in its treaty but offers no definition as to what constitutes ‘portfolio 
investment’. Article 1 (3) (a) (a) (b) reads; ‘for greater certainty, investment does not 
include portfolio investment’.77 This exposes the treaty to potential litigation where 
terms are contradictory and not properly defined.  
All definitions coherently describe investment in quite a comprehensive manner 
nevertheless the meaning of investment will depend on the context for which it is 
incorporated. Salacuse can be credited for a simplified definition describing investment 
                                                                 
73Article 1 of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of 
Kenya for the Promotion and Protection of Investment (2014). 
74 Sornarajah M (2017) 226. 
75 Sornarajah M (2017) 226. 
76 Article 1 of the Agreement between Canada and the Federal Republic of Senegal for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments. 
77 Article 1 (3) (a) (a) (b) of the Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement between 
the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(2016). 
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as ‘the commitment of resources by a physical or legal person to a specific purpose in 
order to earn a profit or to gain a return’.78 Although commitments of resources 
constitute a major part of the definition, he came to the conclusion that most treaties if 
not all define investment within the scope of contractual rights and property, control 
attributes and enterprise form of investment.79 
As seen above, the definition of investment indicated by all treaties consistently 
acknowledges the basic features posited by various scholars, but differ in the context 
for which they apply. It then follows that the incorporation of investment and the 
distinctive definitions suggested by individual treaty as to what constitute an 
investment, will be limited to the scope prescribed to investment by the state parties 
in relation to the  treaty. Understanding the benefits of this provision, will require 
interpretations of treaties given by the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).  
2.4 Understanding the purpose of the treaty in selected African BITs 
The foundation of a treaty is the general rules guiding the interpretation of the treaty.80 
This rule states that a treaty should be defined ordinarily according to its object and 
purpose. Article 31 (1) of the (VCLT) states that;  
‘A Treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose’.81 
The rules contained in the treaty are expressed in the context of its object and 
purpose, thus keeping the parties’ agreement as the sole basis of the decision.82 
Based on observation, all treaties indicated in this thesis explicitly starts by 
explaining the purpose of the agreements as it were. The only difference appears in 
the manner in which the content was written. Each treaty highlights the importance of 
‘promoting and protecting’ investment of investors of one party in the territory of the 
other party. Citing the introduction of the Canada-Senegal (2014) BIT, it states; 
                                                                 
78 Salacuse J W The Three Laws of International Investment (2013) 3.  
79 Salacuse J W (2013) 4. 
80 Salacuse J W (2010) 140. 
81 Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
82 Schefer K N International Investment Law Text Cases and Materials  (2016) 42. 
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‘Recognizing that the promotion and the protection of investments of investors of one 
Party in the territory of the other Party will be conducive to the stimulation of mutually 
beneficial business activity…to the promotion of sustainable development.’83 
This treaty specifically identifies the intentions of both parties to the agreement by 
upholding the need to promote and protect investments in territories of both parties in 
a coordinated manner that is beneficial to all meaning, ‘favourable’ conditions may be 
provided to enhance development and cooperation. The question therein is, who will 
be the biggest beneficiary of these conditions? Perhaps the term ‘favourable’ as 
opposed to ‘conducive’ can apply and the limits to which these conditions will be 
provided should be clearly expressed in the introduction. The Japan-Kenya (2016) BIT 
avoided the use of the word ‘protection’ but rather limit its scope of commitments to 
‘promotion’ in its introduction; 
‘Desiring to further promote investment in order to strengthen the economic 
relationship between…..’84 
The introductory note seems less appealing due to the fact that the term ‘protection’ 
was omitted from the clause which could raise investors’ concern leading to 
inconsistencies in the provisions. However it places emphasis on ‘promotion’ and 
provides other conditions typical of a traditional BIT in fostering economic cooperation 
and development. The Morocco-Nigeria (2016) BIT expresses its agreement as 
‘reciprocal investment promotion and protection’ but fails to highlight the need for 
‘protection’ in its preamble nonetheless it mentions the need for promoting investment 
opportunities as well as cooperation in enhancing sustainable development. 
Paragraph three of the preamble states; 
‘Seeking to promote, encourage and increase investment opportunities that enhance 
sustainable development within the territories of the state parties.85  
Thus, it is important that these introductory notes are carefully scripted to 
accommodate the objectives set out in these treaties. Situations where they are clearly 
identified gives an indication of the overall purpose of the agreement which should be 
consistent throughout the treaty for the promotion and protection of investment. For 
instance the Canada-Senegal (2014) BIT consistently emphasised the need to 
                                                                 
83 Introductory note on the Canada-Senegal (2014) BIT. 
84 Introductory note on the Japan-Kenya (2016) BIT. 
85 Paragraph 3 of the preamble of Morocco-Nigeria (2016) BIT 
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‘promote and protect’ investments in mutually beneficial business activity to the 
development of economic cooperation and development between nations.86 Article 3 
of the Canadian-Senegalese (2014) BIT further buttresses the need for promotion of 
investment by stating that; 
‘Each Party shall encourage the creation of favourable conditions for investment in its 
territory by investors of the other Party and shall admit those investments in 
accordance with the agreement.’87 
These proclamations are aimed at strengthening relationships and cooperation 
between contracting parties. In further expressions, all three treaties codified each 
agreement by establishing the ‘definition of terms’ at the beginning and identifying 
each term with respect to the treaty. In spite of the content, each selected BIT was 
uniquely designed to serve the purpose of the agreement. The next section will be 
dedicated to discussions of selected clauses representing protection and promotion of 
investments in selected African BITs.  
2.5 Legal interpretation of Protection and Promotion of investment clauses of 
Selected BITs 
 
This section focuses on the interpretation of the protection and promotion of 
investment clauses in BITs. Provisions to be discussed include minimum standard of 
treatment, most favoured nation, national treatment, expropriation as well as dispute 
settlement mechanisms. This thesis will examine the various clauses detailing the 
treatment standards listed above and how they relate to the protection and promotion 
of investments in Africa. 
2.5.1 Minimum Standard of Treatment 
 
I. Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) 
 
The origin of the FET clause dates back to the era of the mid 1900’s, a time the 
economic cooperation and developments were the primary focus of sovereign states. 
The aim was to protect investors against violations perpetrated by the host country as 
                                                                 
86 Introductory note on the Canada-Senegal (2014) BIT. 
87 Article 3 of the Canada-Senegal (2014) BIT. 
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part of the conditions for international cooperation and agreements.88 In 
acknowledging the importance of this standard in most treaties, the standard is widely 
viewed as one of the most important yet controversial provisions considered during 
investment disputes.89 However, by virtue of its broadness and ambiguity, it is difficult 
to interpret its legal obligations and it must be considered on a case to case basis.90 
One such case is Neer v Mexican United State91 decided in 1926 where the arbitral 
ruling was subject to different interpretations ranging from denial of justice, fair and 
equitable treatment to the minimum standard of treatment in customary international 
law.92 Literature suggests that investment arbitration tribunals have struggled in 
unpacking and delivering a clear direction as to how this standard is to be applied.93 
The Neer case demonstrated the complexity of interpreting the treatment of foreign 
nationals and their property using the international minimum standard provisions.94 
This has caused much anxiety due to the content and vagueness in interpretation.95 A 
popularly used mechanism of providing adequate remedy in categorising and 
unbundling this challenge is the introduction of the investor-state arbitration. 
Present day experiences have revolutionised the arbitral discourse demonstrating the 
importance of the BITs by making provision for investor – state arbitration. Within the 
scope of this provision, the state recognises the treatment of foreigners and their 
investments as sacrosanct. This is carefully covered within the framework of the 
minimum standard of treatment in international investment law and termed ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’.96 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) cases 
                                                                 
88 Leite K ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: A search for a better balance in International 
Investment Agreements’ (2016) American University Journal of International Law & Policy 370. 
89 Leite K (2016) 371. 
90 Leite K (2016) 371. 
91 International Arbitration Case Law (IACL) available at  www.internationalarbitrationcaselaw.com/new-
cases/neervmexicodecisiononthemeritsbymariakostytska (accessed 14 September 2018). In this case, 
a U.S citizen Paul Neer and a few men were arrested but later released. The U.S brought a claim 
against Mexico in the U.S Mexico General Claims Commission for denial of justice but eventually the 
commission ruled in favour of Mexico pointing out errors in the manner in which the investigation was 
carried out. 
92 Leite K (2016) 373. 
93 Leite K (2016) 372. 
94 Leite K (2016) 374. 
95 Sornarajah (2017) 240. 
96 Leite K (2016) 374. 
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namely S.D Myers v Canada97 and Pope & Talbot, Inc. v Canada98  illustrate the 
approaches Canada has adopted as a reflection of the correction of the Neer case 
thus setting high standards for minimum treatments by arbitration tribunals.99 S.D 
Myers v. Canada100 demonstrated the different view the arbitral tribunal took in 
interpreting violations in national treatment (NT) and FET standard.101 The tribunal 
concluded that indeed the NT and FET standard were violated, however the violations 
to FET situations in arbitrary treatments were unacceptable from an international point 
of view.102 Sornarajah’s opinion in his concluding remarks regarding this treatment, 
echoed that the tribunal consciously limited its scope of the interpretation of the 
violation of standard according to customary international law.103 
The case of Pope and Talbot Inc. v. Canada104 provided a different dimension to 
tribunal arbitral awards which changed the course of arbitral decisions unlike the S.D 
Myers case.105 This case was also attributed to violations in treatment standards 
ranging from NT to FET standards. The complexity of the case resorted the tribunal to 
reaffirming its verification review by reconsidering the interpretation of FET standard 
and not relying on a static position reminiscent of the Neer Claim.106 This tribunal 
thoroughly explored and gave more content to FET standard by broadening the scope 
of the standards beyond the basic requirements of international minimum standard in 
international law.107 In broadening the content, the tribunal concluded by considering 
the severity of interference as substantial deprivations which should be 
compensable.108 The effect of this decision will reflect in structural changes in future 
                                                                 
97 S.D. Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), First Partial Award, paras. 284-8 
(Nov 13, 2000). It was a complex case on waste disposal.SD Myers, an American company operating 
in Canada is in the business of disposing hazardous waste. Canada on the other hand imposed ban on 
export of waste to the United States. The case involved violations in minimum standard of treatment  
however the tribunal concluded that action taken by closing the border thereby denying market access 
for 18months does not amount to indirect expropriation. 
98 Pope and Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCTRAL (NAFTA) Interim Award, (June 26, 
2000). 
99 Leite K (2016) 373.  
100 S.D. Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), First Partial Award, (Nov 13, 2000).  
101 Schefer K N (2016) 239. Different interpretations were given by different tribunals. First denied claim 
based on regulation while the other was satisfied with claimants compliant premised on a year denial 
of investment opportunities. 
102 Sornarajah M (2017) 413. 
103 Sornarajah M (2017) 413. 
104 Pope and Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCTRAL (NAFTA) Interim Award, (June 26, 
2000). 
105 Sornarajah M (2017) 413.   
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treaties giving more meaning to standard treatments when concluding agreements. 
By so doing, clarity is provided with clauses that restricts interference to avoid 
compensations. All this was done in the effort to provide more answers to pertinent 
questions regarding the investors’ protection against indiscriminate treatment. Be that 
as it may, considering the continuous development in investment law, Sornarajah 
warned that states will continue to challenge the creators of this standard due to 
‘constant threat of their regulatory structures being reviewed by international 
tribunals.’109 Those structures in context are designed to safeguard the independence 
of these institutions tasked with protecting and promoting all investment established 
under the sovereign powers of the state. 
As noted above, every sovereign state comes with its own challenges from socio-
cultural beliefs to economic and political modus operandi. It comes as no surprise that 
different interpretation to this standard can be located in different international 
jurisprudence.110 The FET standard can therefore be considered as problematic in 
application depending on the challenges posed before any arbitration tribunal. From 
this analysis, it is therefore accepted that given the responsibilities vested on this 
standard, it would be certain that it would place undue burden on any state, most 
especially developing and least-developed countries around the globe.111 The 
challenge for sovereign states therefore is, how it plans to strike a balance between 
enacting policies that are friendly and not in conflict with customary international law 
and ensuring that the state remains committed to its treaty obligation of equitable 
treatment for all investments within its territory.  
The conclusion of BITs ensures that host countries abide to the commitments made 
in their treaties as a matter of law and approval to the enforcement mechanism 
provided.112 By so doing, promotion of foreign investments are viewed in light of 
mitigating political interference, encouraging inward and outward flow of investment 
between contracting states, preventing uncompensated expropriation and 
                                                                 
109 Sornarajah M (2017) 415. 
110 “Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law” OECD 2004 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment -policy/WP-2004_3.pdf (accessed 03 March 2019). 
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discriminatory treatments thereby reducing the risk to investors.113 Protecting and 
promoting of investments in BITs then suggest that it remains a critical criteria to 
gaining investors’ confidence in the long run. Without these minimum standards, it 
becomes elusive for host nations to guarantee full substantial benefits to its developing 
economy however, the restrictive nature of the protection clauses tend to insulate the 
host countries to the vulnerability of regulating the foreign investment and the adverse 
effects its generates.114  
 The FET discourse as indicated by all three selected African BITs, each agreement 
specifically highlighted this clause under the term ‘Minimum Standard of Treatment’ 
apart from the Japan – Kenya BIT (2016)115 which codified its provision as ‘General 
Treatment and Improvement of Investment Environment’. Article 6(1) & (2) of the 
Canada –Senegal (2014) BIT gives a short description of this provision as: 
‘Each Party shall accord to a covered investment treatment in accordance 
with the customary international law minimum standard of investment of 
aliens, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security’ 
And 
‘The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and 
security” in paragraph 1 do not require treatment in addition to or beyond 
that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard 
of treatment of aliens’.116 
The obligations enshrined in all three agreements stress the importance of the 
minimum standard of treatment in relation to customary international law. This 
standard ensures that favourable conditions for investment are established for either 
contracting party in the territory of the other party.117 The term also used in the Japan-
Kenya 2016 BIT i.e. ‘General Treatment and Improvement of Investment Environment’ 
gives an indication of promoting investment by both states by improving the conditions 
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114 Vandevelde K J (2000) 499. 
115 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Kenya for the 
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for which businesses will thrive in both territories. The argument therefore will be, what 
has been improved over the years to support the premise of an enabling business 
environment? In order to determine this, a thorough analysis on the economic 
developments of both states in relation to legislations guiding the standard must be 
established. Consequently, this will resort to an inter-disciplinary approach. 
Unfortunately, that goes beyond the scope of this study, however the paper hopes to 
establish if actually this ‘FET’ standard propagate protection and promotion obligations 
but limits its research on the area of jurisprudence of the treaties.  
Salacuse is of the opinion that customary international law requires that treaties 
accords to investors FET as ways to develop and intensify economic cooperation 
between the contracting states for the benefit of both.118 This very important provision 
remains general and vague because it doesn’t explain explicitly what constitutes FET. 
The difficulty in explaining what the FET clause entails brought about the suggestion 
by various scholars that it is an ‘all-encompassing provision that embraces 
generality’.119 Therefore, due to the nature by which the clause have been interpreted, 
it is further suggested that African BITs provides a sui generis explanation on what 
constitutes the FET provision.  
Observing the common application of the FET and Full Protection and Security (FPS), 
Article 5 [3] of the Japan –Kenya (2016) BIT took a satisfactory approach by stating 
that the agreement shall take ‘appropriate measures’ to further improve the investment 
environment . The article provides as follows; 
‘Each Contracting Party shall take “appropriate measures” to further improve 
investment environment in its area for the benefit of investors of the other contracting 
party and their investments. In this regard, each Contracting Party shall endeavour to 
create and maintain favourable conditions for the investors of the other Contracting 
Party and their investments with respect to investment activities as well as the 
establishment, acquisition and expansion of investment’.120 
An argument can suffice with the suggestion of another seemingly vague and 
ambiguous interpretation to the ‘kind of measures’ that may be put in place to promote 
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investment. On one hand, such measures can improve the conditions under which 
investments will take place while on the other hand, it might hinder the ability to 
conduct such businesses where measures put in place goes against the tenets of  
human rights. It goes further to suggest that lack of clarity can lead to inconsistent 
decisions and inconsistency creates uncertainty which damages the legislative 
expectations of investors and states.121 
The case of Foresti v. South Africa122 illustrates a classical example of a compromise 
between international human right obligation and investor protection provided by the 
FET clause. The compromise in interpretation emanates from the submissions to 
arbitration by the Italian investor that the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
policies adopted by South Africa violates the FET clause contained in South Africa-
Italy BIT.123 This policy required a system of renewed licencing before exploitation 
exercise124 mandating investors to hire black managers as stated by the Minerals and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) as a means of empowering 
historically disadvantaged persons.125 This sparked international outcry with the 
investors challenging these policies claiming they violated South Africa international 
obligation under its BIT amounting to expropriation under international law.126 Others 
who lay claims as non-disputing parties (NDP) alleged that the Act was discriminatory 
and went against public interest and human rights.127 Although the case was settled 
outside the tribunal,128 it gained recognition amongst experts as topical in the sense 
that it has raised international attention to issues of human rights and international 
investment law as well as finding answers to legal questions by tribunals on the 
governing principles on which Foresti v. South Africa129 might be decided.130 It also 
showed the difficulty in which arbitrators will extend international investment treaty 
obligations such as policies against expropriation and application of FET, to 
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accommodate human right policy objectives or interpreted within such framework.131 
This case set precedence as to how difficult it was in interpreting the FET clause while 
accommodating the state commitments to human rights obligations towards its people. 
Further insight suggest that the arbitration cannot be exclusively limited to FET 
standards but other perceived violations which conclusively remains topical in various 
tribunal deliberations.  
Scholarly opinion shows more inconsistency in tribunal decisions between NT and 
FET. Those expressions suggest that the FET standards should be broadly interpreted 
to include several categories that gives more meaning to the standard. In the course 
of an extensive study carried out by United Nation Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), it was suggested that the FET standard should include 
categories as denial of justice, arbitrariness, discrimination, abusive treatment and 
violation of legitimate expectation.132 While Sornarajah concluded that the first four 
categories define the basis of international minimum standard, the last category of 
legitimate expectation remained new to minimum standard framework.133 This broad 
open ended concept, tend to hinder government responsibility and creates undue 
burden on the state, which may indirectly infringe on the government’s ability to 
regulate and conduct its business of protecting public interest.134  
The tribunal in the case of Tecmed v. Mexico135 case which set off the interpretation 
on legitimate expectation in the context of FET standard can be said to have opened 
a can of worms for a breach in FET standards, in conditions where promises have 
been made to investors in both contracts and non-contractual documents in the law of 
the host state.136 In this case, Schefer argued that the tribunal considered what the 
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investor expected and what the investor could legitimately have expected.137 
Balancing the rights of the state to regulate and the interest of the investor more often 
than not, suggest that arbitrators become less critical in determining legitimate 
expectation.138   
What this discourse highlights is interpretation accorded to the FET standard by 
arbitrators. Research suggest that by expanding the very nature of this definition, 
tendencies of aggravating law suits against host states proves imminent.139 This in 
return hinders the ability of the tribunal to act effectively in passing down decisions 
pertaining investment disputes. It can also be said that it can easily lead to arbitration 
crisis in investment treaties knowing that the review carried out by tribunals directly 
threatens state sovereignty.140 
So many other cases have proved that the FET standard is problematic in its 
approach, application and interpretation. Despite the strong resistance from states to 
continuously request tribunals to expand the interpretation of FET standards,141 states 
have opted to link its NT standard with the FET in its treaties. This brings some sort of 
relief to the state by giving more meaning to the FET standard. In order words, the 
state can regulate effectively while the rights of the investors are not violated. Future 
treaties can follow the same approach to mitigate litigations against the host state. 
The conclusion of BITs will require more than just giving more content to the FET 
standard but also extending those privileges to include Full Protection and Security 
(FPS). Growing concerns on the nature of security provided will be discussed below. 
ii. Full Protection and Security (FPS) 
 
History suggests that the FPS standard has existed to protect foreign interest as far 
back as the ancient Greece through the middle ages, and finally crystallised into 
contemporary FPS standards in the twenty first century.142 These standards were not 
only limited to physical protection and security, but also extended to legal protection 
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too.143 It must be accepted that this standard is aptly recognised by customary 
international law stressing that the host state takes responsibility for protecting aliens 
threatened by violence within its territory.144 In order for the standard to be vastly 
accepted, various scholars have suggested that due diligence must be exercised. Due 
diligence in context states that certain actions, conduct or behaviour must be followed 
by the State in order to effectively protect other states from harm through legislative 
and administrative actions.145 
Chen echoes that by adopting an alternative model like improving domestic institutions 
of host states, investors as well as importing states benefit from increased FDI 
invariably translating to better opportunities for investments in host states.146 His 
postulation can also be construed to mean strengthening domestic institutions to make 
it more attractive for investors to commit capital investments towards developing the 
host state. Achieving such status will involve defining the roles of each domestic 
institution clear of prejudice but secured with legislative oversight. While the customary 
interpretation of the FPS standard relates to the physical security of the investment 
only, more recent tribunals have expanded the standard to also include securing the 
legal and economic stability of the investment.147 In the case of Biwater Gauff Ltd v 
Republic of Tanzania,148 the tribunal stated that the FPS standard is afforded when a 
State guarantees a stable and secure physical, commercial, and legal environment. 
For instance, the tribunal considered that Tanzania violated its obligation to provide 
adequate physical security in actions that constitute seizure of City Waters offices and 
the deportation of its staff.149 
Junngam opined that the responsibility to initiate due diligence rest within the confines 
of the host state.150 His argument follows the reasoning that, the level of protection to 
be accorded will depend on the level of development of the host state.151 Therefore 
FPS responsibilities in internalising ‘due diligence’ is a function of other variables that 
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are dependent on the overall development of the host state i.e. level of political and  
economic stability, availability of resources and capacity space.152 The literature then 
suggests that international investments will not function efficiently if the FPS standard 
is absent or not uniquely defined to serve the interest of Contracting States.153 While 
some investment treaties have omitted this standard altogether, it is advisable for 
countries to define the parameters to which this standard will apply in treaty 
negotiations. For example, Article 7 2(b) of the Morocco-Nigeria (2016).154 
All selected BITs indicated that FPS shall be included as part of the minimum standard 
of treatment in international law however only the Morocco – Nigeria (2016) BIT 
explained briefly the need for police protection as required by customary international 
law.155 Article 7  2(b) of this treaty states that ‘FPS requires each party to provide the 
“level of police protection” required under customary international law’.156 Although 
most BITs do not go as far as interpreting the level of protection that should be 
accorded to investors as required by customary international law, it is important that 
treaties signed by African countries indicate the obligation of FPS the host country 
should accord to investors. The basic assumption will be based on the host state ability 
to accord protection against its availability to dispose resources.157  
Whatever the case may be, the primary objective of the FPS is to protect the life line 
of the investment in both the short and long run. Part of this expansionist interpretation 
supports Salacuse’s position that this provision can be open to different interpretations 
and has led the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other arbitration tribunals into 
problems of properly defining the scope of protection.158 Be that as it may, 
commentators have suggested that the obligation by host countries in granting due 
diligence in protecting foreign investments is relative and has no absolute inclinations 
but rather reasonable protection and security as determined by customary 
international law.159 
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As a matter of principle, host government should uphold the responsibility of protecting 
investments in their territory. Unprecedented situation might find host governments in 
precarious positions if their attention to detail are left in doubt and unguarded. An 
example is the case of Wena Hotels Ltd v Egypt160 where the government failed in its 
obligations to protect and secure a hotel from some disgruntled employees and were 
thus held liable and ordered to pay compensation to investors for damages. The 
tribunal had no doubt that Egypt had violated its FPS because it was aware of the  
intention to seize the hotels but took no appropriate action against the perpetrators.161 
It is therefore necessary for host states to take responsibility of providing a legal 
framework that ensures that no absolute liability is placed on any of the contracting 
parties. What different tribunals has held consistently is that, host states must accord 
due diligence at all time.162 
Finally, it can be argued that customary international law sets the basis for which the 
FPS must be applied thus it is expected that the provision does not go below the 
anticipated set standard stated to be in accordance with customary international law. 
What customary international law requires is for the host state to accord a minimum 
standard of treatment which includes FET and FPS.163 Therefore it will be of best 
interest of all parties to provide some level of protection while the treaties creates an 
autonomous provision for FPS as most have done but with additional clause 
compelling the host state to provide additional protection and security synonymous to 
the national treatment, expressing same treatment for all investments. 
2.6 Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Standard in Relation to Selected African BITs 
 
One of the legal documents used for a legal recourse is the BIT. This instrument has 
protected FDI inflows in Africa within the scope of its investment rules in Regional 
Economic Agreements.164 As a standard requirement for most BITs, the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) requirement remains critical in the overall framework of its 
legal text. This standard ensures that uniform standard of treatment are accorded to 
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the contracting parties to a BIT and such treatment should also be extended to 
investments and investors of third parties.165 Cole stated that one of the primary 
functions of the MFN clause is to ‘ensure that whenever benefits are given to investors 
from one state, they must also be provided to investors from any other state with an 
applicable MFN clause, thereby ensuring equality of treatment.’166 The manner in 
which this provision is included in the BIT will depend on the level of cooperation 
contracting parties intend to adopt. Kidane argues that in spite of the growing number 
of intra-Africa BIT agreements, not a single dispute has been recorded in the ICSID 
tribunals.167 Thus, more bilateral agreements within the African continent should be 
embarked upon in other to facilitate more FDI inflows into the continent. 
Considering the content of the African BITs under investigation, Ofidile opined that 
there are variations to how this standard is drafted.168 Some are limited to certain 
minimum requirement standards i.e. guided by the FET principle, others stand 
independently of any sort of principles in the BIT while lastly, given the nature of the 
BIT, other MFN standards incorporate some level of exceptions which are tied to the 
conditions highlighted in the BITs.169 These variations can be observed in the African 
BITs under investigation. Article 6 of the Morocco – Nigeria (2016)170 BIT fused 
together the provision for MFN and NT, stressing the need for encouraging and 
creating favourable conditions for investors and their investment in territories of the 
contracting parties. It goes further in Art 6 (2) and (3) in stating the conditions for which 
each state will accord the ‘like circumstances’ to be no less favourable to investment 
than that accorded to its own investors in accordance with the laws and regulations of 
the state. There are exceptions to the like circumstances which are listed in Art 6 (3) 
which are in line with the general requirements as suggested by commentators in the 
very nature of the BIT. One discerning feature of this BIT is the manner in which it 
expresses its limitations with regards to present and future changes in national affairs 
and other anticipated future agreements. Art 6 (5) affirms;  
                                                                 
165 Ofidile U E ‘Africa-China Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Critique’ (2013) 35 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 167. 
166 Cole T ‘The boundaries of Most Favored Nation Treatment in International Investment Law’ (2012) 
33 Michigan Journal of International Investment Law 540. 
167 Kidane W (2018) 540. 
168 Ofidile U E (2013) 168. 
169 Ofidile U E (2013) 168. 
170 Article 6 of Morocco – Nigeria (2016) BIT 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 
 
33 
 
‘The treatment granted under 1, 2, and 4 of this article shall not be “construed as to 
preclude” national security, public security or public order nor oblige one Party to 
extend to the investors of the other Party and their investment the benefit of any 
treatment, preference or privilege from… .’171  
This BIT in its requisite nature made it explicitly clear that any measure adopted after 
this agreement comes into effect, must notify and justify the reasons for adopting such 
measure in its entirety as soon as ‘practicable’. Art 6 (6) states; 
‘As soon as practicable after a Party adopts a measure under this Article that 
Party shall inform the other Party of the justification for the measures 
adopted, as well as the scope and relevance of such measures.’172 
‘The word ‘Practicable’ could be interpreted in so many ways because it does not give 
an exact time frame which may prove problematic in times of BIT violations by either 
Contracting Party. While some commentators have suggested that this very important 
clause run the risk of being over- interpreted,173 it is imperative that in times of conflict 
resolution, arbitrators are encouraged in the best interest of justice to consider 
consulting other bilateral investment treaties to ensure consistency in procedure and 
application. Hence Whitsitt suggested that, 
‘Thus, if MFN clauses are viewed as having the primary objectives of promoting non- 
discrimination and harmonisation, then an adjudicator may consider that the very 
purpose of the clause is to permit, indeed encourage, a comparison to other BITs to 
ensure that the most favourable rights, including procedural rights, are available’.174  
In so doing, clarity in the proper scope and applicability of MFN protection within the 
context of International Investment law will be easily articulated. In the case of 
Occidental Exploration and Production company v Ecuador,175 the United States 
brought a claim against Ecuador for violating its BIT on the basis of imposing Value 
Added Tax (VAT) on Occidental Exploration an International U.S Oil and Gas 
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Company.176 The Tribunal dismissed the claims on expropriation for reasons that it 
wasn’t pertinent to the claims but pronounced that the provision on non- discriminatory 
treatment was evident and might have been violated.177 The Tribunal further reiterated 
that the present dispute violated the MFN Treatment thus held the respondent liable 
for violating its commitments to the BIT.178 This is one of many cases whereby 
understanding a particular clause in context might result in a different translation in 
arbitration deliberations.  
Closely observing the selected BITs, the Canada – Senegal (2014) and Japan – Kenya 
(2016) BITs take a different approach with the MFN standard separately catered for. 
As Ofidile indicated, provisions for MFN standards in some BITs are independently 
highlighted and not tied to any set of principles179 however the structure of the clauses 
could also incorporate some exceptions to the MFN standard.180 This is not far-fetched 
with the aforementioned BITs. In the Canadian – Senegal (2014) BIT, the MFN 
Treatment is listed as part of the Substantive Obligations in Section B, which 
expresses the independence of the MFN clause in like circumstances. Article 5 (1) 
states; 
‘Each Party shall accord to an investor of the other Party treatment no less favourable 
than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of a non –Party with respect to 
the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale 
or other disposition of an investment in its territory’.181  
The beauty of the Canadian – Senegal (2014) Treaty is its ability to articulate itself 
clearly with limited ambiguity. Paragraph 3 of Article 5 of its (MFN) Treatment 
illustrates the exceptions of the like circumstances to sub-national government which 
should extend to investments of investors and non – Party to the treaty. In other words, 
no less favourable treatment by other tiers of government should be accorded to 
signatories of this treaty and non-Parties. Inference could be drawn from Cole’s 
argument that ‘if more favourable treatment is provided to investors from a third state, 
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an obligation arises to provide equivalent treatment to those investors benefiting from 
the MFN clause’.182 Understanding the immediate effect of the MFN clause can be 
factored from two dimensions namely, ‘Right to Claim’ and ‘Instantaneous 
Obligations’.183  
The ‘Right to Claim’ argument from Cole’s perspective states that there are no 
obligations to a treatment provided to a third party only if a party in agreement 
demands equivalent treatment, thus such treatment must be provided.184 For example 
if Party A and B enters a Treaty Agreement and Party B accords a favourable 
treatment to a third party, according to this obligation, an equivalent treatment will  be 
accorded to Party A only if Party A demands it. Alternatively ‘Instantaneous 
Obligations’ eliminates the need for beneficiaries to monitor the State on any MFN 
agreements it enters into.185 In other words, the State is obligated without demand 
from Parties in Agreement to extend equivalent treatment no less favourable to 
contracting parties in question.  
Citing the case of Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain 186 of 18 July1997, Mr Maffezini an 
investor of Argentine origin commenced an arbitration against Spain with issues 
around treatment allegedly received to his investment in production and distribution of 
chemical products in a Spanish region of Galicia. Spain subsequently cited Mr 
Maffezini’s failure to exhaust local remedies before approaching international 
arbitration, stating that the ICSID tribunal had no jurisdiction nor competence to 
oversee arbitration proceedings. Mr Maffezini further argued that the MFN clause in 
the Argentina – Spain BIT afforded him the opportunity to invoke dispute submissions 
to international arbitration without necessarily referring to domestic courts.187 He 
contended that the Chile – Spain BIT does not require an investor to make prior dispute 
submissions to domestic courts before approaching arbitration tribunal, thereby 
according more favourable treatment to the Chilean investor than the Argentines, in 
so doing contravening the MFN clause on treatment.188 In response Spain further 
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made arguments which will not be highlighted at this juncture. In conclusion, the 
tribunal determined that it was within Mr Maffezini right not to exhaust local remedies 
but to make claims directly to the arbitral tribunal.189 
The Maffezini case190 above illustrates the importance of the MFN clause in 
international investment law in addressing obligations which should be accorded to 
contracting parties in no less favourable treatment than it accords to third parties. 
Parker argued that the tribunal assessed the history of MFN treatment in trade treaties 
and concluded that in fact, the situation of protection of foreign investors are 
inextricably related therefore, a general obligation of MFN treatment ought to be 
extended.191 
While the MFN provisions in certain BITs remain silent on its application to dispute 
settlement, both Canada – Senegal (2014) and Morocco –Nigeria (2016) BITs showed 
similar trend. This is a clear indication suggesting that the MFN provision may or may 
not be applicable to the dispute settlement, however it is noteworthy to mention that a 
few exceptions were mentioned in these BITs but nothing critical to the enforcement 
of dispute settlement to this clause. The Japan – Kenya (2016) BIT in its teleological 
narrative, is construed to have laid emphasis on the understanding that the ‘MFN 
Treatment’ is not included in the dispute settlement procedures. This is contained in 
Article 4 (6) where it is understood that with this exception, the agreement curtails the 
ability of any of the contracting parties to invoke other international agreement 
including other investment agreements with regards to the applicability of MFN 
treatment to dispute settlement. Citing Parker’s argument, there are different types of 
MFN clauses, one of which ‘expressively prohibits application to dispute settlement 
provisions’.192  This however, does not mean it totally prohibits the application as such 
but in times of ambiguity i.e. when not clearly defined, such clauses should apply to 
dispute settlement provision.193 
Unlike the Maffezini case194 where the Chile-Spain BIT was invoked by Mr Maffezini 
to give clarity to the Argentina – Spain BIT on matters relating to MFN treatment, the 
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Japan – Kenya (2016) BIT totally avoids such procedure. This was observed in 
modern jurisprudence subsequent to the Maffezini case in recent time195  
In 2003, the Tribunal in the case of Tecmed v Mexico196 denied the claimant access 
to other treaties based on conditions precedent to the basic treaty agreements.197 The 
tribunal held that the dispute settlement provision was specifically negotiated for in 
their treaty. It further concluded that had it not been negotiated, the parties wouldn’t 
have entered into an agreement anyway.198 Therefore the negotiation of BITs and its 
attendant provisions remains critical in addressing the scope and limitations of the 
agreements. Consequently, Parker concluded by arguing that no nation is immune to 
the invasion of the MFN clause and the threat of uncertainty, for the uncertainty lives 
within.199 These are common challenges envisaged for future BITs in Africa hence it 
is suggested that a plausible remedy will be to maintain the status quo of excluding 
the MFN clause from not applying to dispute settlement provisions.200  
The textual compilation of these treaties remains relevant in affording opportunities to 
expanding the protection of investors and investment in the continent. It is therefore 
suggested that the MFN clause be treated as a valuable tool that guarantees investors 
the highest level of treatment. This cannot be overemphasized. 
In subsequent discussions, the dispute settlement procedure as part of the mechanism 
for the protection and promotion of investments in Africa will be discussed 
exhaustively.  
2.7  National Treatment from the perspective of Selected African BITs 
 
The duty to treat foreign investors and their investment in a non-discriminatory manner 
remains one of the obligations found in IIAs.201 This obligation is to accord treatment 
no less favourably than the host treats its national investors and their investments.202  
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Article XVII (I) of the General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) jurisprudence is centred on trade in services however it 
conspicuously prohibits less favourable treatment in relation to like services and 
service suppliers.203 Likewise in investment treaties, this standard also extends to NT 
which prohibits discrimination against investors and investment in like 
circumstances.204 Broadly speaking, in determining the nature and scope of ‘likeness’ 
within IIAs, the competitive relationship between the domestic and international 
investor vis-a-vis the business or economic sector within which these investments are 
made will have to be established to ascertain if these standard is indeed violated.205 
This goes with the fact that each scenario must be considered on a case to case basis 
to establish which legal regime or regulatory requirements will apply.206 
The NT expresses itself in that tone within the regulatory requirements of the BITs 
under investigation. Article 4 of the Canada – Senegal (2014) BIT clearly states the 
conditions of likeness and the business/economic sectors where applicable. Article 4 
(2) goes as far as identifying the scope of the ‘covered agreement’ for which it permits 
its applicability i.e. from date of which the agreement entered into force and the 
investment made or acquired thereafter. It further extends its protection to the sub 
national government in Art 4 (3) and the like circumstances it accords to investors and 
investments of investors. The Japan- Kenya (2016) BIT also followed a similar 
approach but listed an exception in Article 3 paragraph 3. It reads; 
‘Paragraph 1 shall not apply to measures adopted or maintained by Contracting Party 
with respect to incentives only for the purpose of promoting small and medium sized 
enterprises in its area, to the extent that such measures do not materially affect the 
investments or investment activities of the investors of the other Contracting Party’.207 
This is quite important for this BIT because it gives room to government of developing 
economies in Africa to sustain their local investments which might be encroached by 
bigger multinational investments thus leaving the locals uncompetitive. As far as those 
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incentives do not impair the rights of other Investments within the same space, it 
becomes imperative that they all stay afloat. The problem however is how to measure 
the kind of incentives that will be given which will not be destructive.  
Paragraph 2 and 3 of the Morocco-Nigeria (2016) BIT tend to tilt towards the same 
reasoning but makes references to overall assessment of ‘like circumstances’ on a 
case to case basis of investments within the business/economic sector. This is in line 
with the general exception it provides in its NT and MFN clauses. In order to align the 
purpose for the protection of foreign investors, drafters will have to understand the 
determination of ‘like circumstances’ and a detailed understanding of its regulatory 
purposes.208 Overall, the assessment of these provisions tend to be in line with the 
general requirements of NT in all BITs. 
NT are clearly and well scripted in accordance with customary international law in the 
selected BITs. Recommending additional requirements will only put more strain on 
host countries. What is required though is clearly defined parameters of incentives for 
like circumstances to be considered by customary international law. 
2.8  Expropriation and Standard of Compensation 
 
A principal purpose of these investment treaties is to promote and protect investments 
from various governmental actions.209 One such action is ‘expropriation’. 
Schefer describes the term expropriation to ‘refer to a State’s taking property, 
something of value, away from its owner’.210 It could also mean an act that completely 
destroys the value of an investment or one that transfer ownership or possession of 
an investment to the state.211 Whichever form it takes tends to accentuate the 
interpretative meaning of expropriation. 
A myriad of commentators have argued how this action must be carried out by the 
state. One which most have agreed upon is that the state shall expropriate for public 
purposes, accord due process, inter alia offering a reasonable compensation without 
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unreasonable delay.212 In other words, it should be carried out in compliance with the 
due process of law in a non-discriminatory fashion.213Article 10 (1) of the Canada-
Senegal (2014) BIT for instance reads; 
‘A party may not nationalise or expropriate a covered investment either directly or 
indirectly through measures having an effect equivalent to nationalisation or 
expropriation (“expropriation”), except for public purpose, in accordance with due 
process of the law, in a non-discriminatory manner and on payment of compensation… 
.’214  
The term ‘expropriation’ has been used interchangeably with ‘nationalisation’ in this 
BIT giving the scope a wider meaning in application. Not all authors differentiate 
between expropriation and nationalisation because all nationalisations are indeed 
expropriations.215 Depending on the intent of the developing nation, most justify their 
government actions as ‘nationalisation’ referring to a measure for regulating their 
economy.216  
The key to understanding the scope of liability of each potential BIT is the components 
of its substantive rights.217 There are more similarities than discrepancies in the Japan-
Kenya (2016) and Morocco-Nigeria (2014) BITs. Each BIT carefully explains the 
conditions under which expropriation may or may not occur however all highlight the 
need for a case by case and a fact based inquiry to be established to determine an 
equivalent to expropriation. 
On provisions that include the form of expropriation i.e. direct or indirect expropriation, 
Article 8 (2) paragraph (a) and (b) of the Morocco-Nigerian (2016) BIT, generally 
mentions these terminologies but also subjected them to a series of conditions for 
which they will be determined. As is indicated in this provision, where there is evidence 
that expropriation took place either directly or indirectly, the legislation gives each party 
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the right to recourse as agreed by the BIT. The Canada-Senegal (2014) BIT applies 
the same principles and these exceptions are provided for in section E annex B (10) 
under the final provisions. The Japan-Kenya (2016) BIT is silent on forms of 
expropriation which may present a potential legal problem as time lapses. It is 
important therefore that a comprehensive description of this highly sensitive clause be 
included to give clarity so a proper classification to this measure can be applied. For 
example an exception describing direct and indirect expropriation and its economic 
impact on investment which will guide the amount of compensation awarded.  
It is generally accepted under customary international law that one of the requirements 
for expropriation is a prompt, effective and adequate compensation.218 While this 
expropriation is permissible under certain conditions in customary international law, 
the legal rights to expropriate are not always absolute.219 Dolzer argues that the right 
to expropriate must be tantamount to the market value, however in recent times, 
debates from investment tribunals contend that the treaty-based standard of 
compensation in accordance with a fair market value should be considered, which in 
real time is not easy to determine.220 On that note, this thesis cannot agree less with 
Sornarajah position that;      
‘BITs are not made with the aim of subscribing to the formulations of a uniform standard 
of compensation, but are instead efforts by the parties to agree on the standard on which 
they compensate in the event of one of them nationalises the property of a national of the 
other’.221 
2.9  Dispute Settlement 
 
The emergence of investment arbitration sprung up in the mid-20 twentieth century 
and is often referred to as ‘Dispute Settlement Mechanism’ (DSM).222 Its primary 
objective is to provide legal certainty as well as protecting foreign investors and their 
investments within the framework of their international investment agreements.223 This 
protection has resulted in the proliferation of arbitration clauses in BITs and multilateral 
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investment treaties while also raising concerns about its neutrality among contracting 
parties.224  
Amidst the growing concerns of developing countries intentions to redraft and 
reinterpret features of their BITs, it has become increasingly important as part of their 
restructuring strategy, to address definitions incorporated in their BITs.225 They include 
investor and investment, protection provisions, obligation of investors towards home 
and host states, procedures regarding arbitrations as well as concerns of conflict of 
interest of arbitrators.226  
Dispute settlement has become an integral part of investment treaties giving it the 
legitimacy to act as a mechanism to protecting and promoting investors and their 
investments.227 There are however different forms of dispute settlement in international 
investment law, namely, through diplomatic protection,228 state-to-state dispute 
resolution,229 use of force,230  and investor-state dispute settlement.231For the purpose 
of this research, the focus will be placed on understanding Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS) mechanism and the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Dispute (ICSID) under the auspices of the World Bank (WB).232 
BITs have played a very important role in consolidating customary international law 
into the scope of international investment law.233 They have achieved this by 
incorporating certain comprehensive rules in the quest to protect the interest of the 
foreign investor.234  
While there are divergent opinions for and against the ISDS mechanism, 
commentators have expressed concerns over transparency and private incentives for 
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efficient dispute resolution.235 They claim that the mechanism provides a platform in 
international law for private actors to file claims against the state to seek compensation 
for alleged violations or harmful conduct.236 This is not to be misconstrued that 
investors go into dispute settlement for the sole benefit of reaping the state of financial 
rewards but rather of finding an amicable solution to violations suffered against their 
investment. 
Reverting back to the BITs under investigation, the Canada-Senegal (2014) BIT 
makes provision for two dispute settlement mechanisms namely ISDS and the State 
to State Dispute Settlement (SSDS) mechanism. Article 20 right through to (37) 
provides a detailed procedural process by which an arbitration should be instituted. 
Like most dispute settlement processes, Article 22 (1) solemnly recommends that a 
consultation by disputing parties shall first convene to settle any claim if necessary 
before any submission is made to an arbitration. Unless otherwise agreed, the time 
frame for consultation shall be instituted within sixty days of submission of notice of 
intent to claim to arbitration. In other words it is advised that an amicable solution is 
sought within sixty days of the submission. If that fails, the investor is advised to follow 
the procedure lined up from paragraph two to four. Since both parties are signatories 
to the ICSID convention, it is pertinent that the ISCID remains the choice of arbitration 
for both parties. Where one party is a member, the treaty still maintains the ICSID  
Additional Facility Rules and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
The issue of transparency in modern BITs has made headlines in nascent discourse 
on transparency measures. Miles suggested provisions for open proceedings and the 
submission of amicus curiae briefs in new generation BITs.237 A more transparent 
approach to the conduct of hearing has been adopted by the Canada-Senegal (2014) 
BIT making provision for public access to hearing and documentation. This is evident 
in Article 31 and 32 of the BIT. In addition, the treaty makes provision for non-disputing 
party access to the pleadings and the acceptance of non-disputing party submissions. 
The Japan-Kenya (2016) and Morocco-Nigeria (2016) BITs carry almost the same 
pattern with few differences in procedure. One such discrepancy is that both BITs 
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make provision for a longer time for negotiation and consultation. Japan-Kenya 
extends its consultations for six months while Morocco-Nigeria recognises ninety days 
which can be extended by an additional sixty days if mutually agreed by disputing 
parties. This is a positive initiative because it gives room for due consultations and 
proper deliberations. Exhausting local remedies through a competent court of choice 
between parties is recommended. 
Another difference is that they also do not make provision for a State to state dispute 
settlement but acknowledges the transparency clause by inclusion in the respective 
BITs. State to state dispute settlement promotes diplomatic relationships therefore by 
excluding them, the chances of a fair deliberation through the agreed method might 
be compromised because of the lack of trust in the institution.  
With regards to transparency measures, it is suggested that access to public hearing 
be allowed because they innately involve matters of public interest.238  If left out, it will 
suggest that transparency conditions in investor-state arbitration at their current 
description are opaque.239This is the position of the Japan-Kenya (2016) BIT, where 
the transparency clause excludes public hearing which is a major factor in promoting 
credibility in the dispute process. Absence of this access invokes limitation to public 
confidence when appraising future engagements. The suggested intervention when 
properly managed, have assisted in giving a higher level of predictability and reliability 
to dispute settlement and reduced the risk of short-term reversal to that policy path 
driven by vested interest.240In the interest of fairness and public disclosure, it is 
recommended that access to public hearing be incorporated in suggested future BIT. 
2.10 Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the importance of selected treatment standards to the 
protection and promotion of investments in various bilateral investment treaties in 
Africa. In the course of the investigations, it was apparent that most commentators 
resonate to the ideal that the Canadian/ United States Model BITs remained a 
reference point to what constitute a well scripted BIT.  
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The investigation first examined the purpose of each treaty and was quick to identify 
that each treaty followed the standard practice of defining the purpose of the 
agreements while highlighting the importance of promotion and protection of 
investments in the territory of the other party. Although, the textual content of the BITs 
under investigation were scripted differently, they all carried similar narratives in terms 
of the definition of purpose within their legislative framework. Further analysis revealed 
that the FET standard expressed seems ambiguous and vague in definition.  
The importance of this standard was not comprehensively described however it is 
expected that they comply with the requirements of customary international law. The 
FPS standard of both Canada-Senegal (2014) and Japan-Kenya (2016) also seem 
vague and ambiguous. They could be subject to very broad interpretations which might 
lead to litigations. Both BITs do not describe the exact kind of protection that should 
be provided as opposed to that of Morocco-Nigeria (2016) BIT which mentioned ‘level 
of police protection required’. The SSDS settlement and transparency provisions 
highlighted by the Canada-Senegal (2014) BIT gives room for alternative DS 
mechanism which could invoke more effectiveness and confidence between 
contracting parties. Japan-Kenya (2016) and Morocco-Nigeria (2016) only recognises 
the ISDS which limits its options to alternative dispute settlement resolution methods. 
Seemingly, the limitation in scope of the transparency clause in the Japan-Kenya 
(2016) BIT, raises red flags however if access to public hearing is included, might 
elevate the level of confidence of the host state and third parties total evaluation of the 
arbitration process. 
Concluding comments suggest that African treaties adopt a consistent approach of 
identifying in text, the need for treaties to protect and promote investments in their 
regions. The Canadian-Senegal (2014) BIT have done that consistently, confirming 
their commitments to strengthening their international investment agreements which 
have been reviewed in their bilateral agreements. Overall, the treaties under 
investigation have laid out their obligation consistently by stating their commitments to 
the standards in accordance with customary international law however, the 
fundamental objective of determining whether these provisions have truly protected 
and promoted investments in Africa remains evasive due to the nature to which they 
were designed. These clauses in question are designed more to protect international 
investors and their investments. Promotion as a concept is hardly expressed in the 
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textual context of Japan-Kenya (2016) and Morocco-Nigeria (2016) BIT. It is the 
opinion of this thesis that ‘promotion’ can only be determined by meticulously 
screening the laws, legislation, tax break and other elements of ease of doing business 
in relation to its BIT before successfully arguing a case to that effect. That goes beyond 
the scope of the thesis nevertheless, more of the word ‘promotion’ needs to be seen 
in treaty text to eliminate investor’s negative perception about investing in African 
economies. 
The next chapter will explore the South African Protection of Investment Act 22 of 
2015.The thesis will be assessing the protection and promotion of investment clauses 
in line with SA constitutional provision to its attractiveness to international investors.  
Suggested opinions to the attractiveness are speculative considering the nascent 
introduction of this Act. Highlights to factors that led to the promulgation of this 
legislation will be articulated appropriately. The Act came into effect in July 2018 
therefore premature to wholly make assumptions on its effectiveness, hence this paper 
will acknowledge its benefit/challenges. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF INVESTMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
Critics suggest that negotiation of BITs and other investment treaties are procedurally 
unfair,241 which led to various states reviewing their commitments to the process. One 
example is South Africa which began reviewing its BIT with several European 
countries in October 2012.242 This chapter focuses on South Africa’s Protection of 
Investment Act 22 0f 2015 in relation to the BITs signed before the Act was 
promulgated. It will discuss the BIT regime prior to the Act as well as the decision by 
the government to review its position with various countries with regards to its 
investment treaties and its relevance to the overall legislative framework of protection 
and promotion of investment in Africa. 
3.2 Brief historical background of the South African BIT regime 
 
From 1994 till date, South Africa have signed forty nine BITs of which twelve are in 
force.243 Within this space of time, the South African government has also cancelled 
some of its BITs. They realised amongst others that FDI does not always materialise 
or are projected to be in favour of developing countries.244 The UNCTAD 2018 report 
suggests that for the first time, the number of effective treaty terminations outpaced 
the number of new IIAs. This is not to be construed as meaning that BITs are outdated, 
rather, countries have embarked on steps to  formulate new generation of sustainable 
development orientated IIAs by reviewing their treaty network and revising their treaty 
models.245   
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The report confirmed an increase in the number of new treaty based ISDS new 
cases.246 This does not come as a big surprise as many countries continue to 
modernise their existing stock of old generation treaties.247 Motala argued that by 
cancelling the BITs, the South African investment Act allowed for recalibration of rights 
and responsibilities of the investor and the state.248 This action necessitated the 
government to review its commitments to the old treaties because it threatened its 
constitutional sovereignty thereby surrendering its state’s law and policy to external 
challenges. 
Other factors that led to the renegotiations of BITs was the unprecedented adoption 
of the UK draft Model BIT by SA as the basis to conclude other BITs with developed 
countries.249 South Africa signed its first BIT with the United Kingdom in 1994 at ‘a time 
when the country was on the precipice of emerging into a democratic society’.250 The 
signing of this BIT prompted the country to engage in further negotiations with other 
European countries over the next four years.251 The UK and European model  BIT 
referred to by Coleman and  William as the ‘northern hemisphere model’ was wholly 
unsuited for a country restructuring its economy in order to correct the economic and 
social skews of its difficult past, ‘the apartheid era’.252 The unanticipated problems with 
the adoption of the UK Model by SA were the incompatibility in the level of 
development of both economies at that point in time. SA needed funding to support its 
ambitious aspirations. As a nascent democracy and a developing nation, conditions 
around the features of the UK Model BIT were fundamentally not aligned to that of 
SA’s developmental goals.253 After the signing of other BITs, SA soon realised that 
much of the language used in the EU-SA BITs covertly undermined its position, 
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subjecting South Africa to submitting its resources for exploitation.254 The features of 
the proposed Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
based model included,  
 fair and equitable treatment to be accorded to foreign investors and their 
investment at all time,  
 there should be no discrimination and expropriation,  
 contracts remained binding, facilitating movement of capital without restrictions,  
 International arbitration to be adjudicated in investor-state dispute 
processes.255 
A policy change from exploitative investment agreements to an inclusive humanistic 
approach became the order of the day.256 The government of SA further concluded 
that BITs ‘pose risks and limitations on the ability of the government to pursue its 
constitutional based transformation agenda’.257 
3.3 South Africa BIT review process and factors that prompted the review 
 
The period following the end of apartheid and the signing of new BITs with several 
European countries without fully evaluating the long term effect of the ‘protection of 
investor’ obligation triggered South Africa’s attention to the complexity of BITs.258 The 
ANC led government at the time was deeply conflicted about supporting its new 
development policies through BITs however it needed funding to support its goal.259 It 
had to find a way of attracting FDI without necessarily compromising its sovereignty to 
the west. Prior to this time, the retrogressive impact of the international sanctions and 
tight capital control was taking a toll on South Africa.260 Nevertheless, attracting foreign 
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investments was an important component of ANC economic strategy.261 In securing 
investors’ confidence in 1994, Nelson Mandela stated; 
‘We are determined to create the necessary climate which the foreign investor will find 
attractive’.262 He further narrated that ‘in our economic policies…there is not a single 
reference to things like nationalisation, and this is not accidental. There is not a single 
slogan that will connect us with any Marxist ideology.’263 
The address was well welcomed by the business leaders from various communities 
despite a looming fear by a few that the ANC economic policy might lurch in a radical 
direction.264 Twenty four years down the line, the narrative is beginning to change with 
recent clamour for the expropriation of Land without compensation.  
Prior 1994, SA had a long history of racial inequality and political unrest.265 In resolving 
the damage done by the apartheid regime, the ANC led government embarked on 
signing a number of BITs with its European counterparts to stimulate the long awaited 
restructuring of its nascent democracy. Between 1994 and1998, SA experienced a 
surge in BIT engagements with the republic signing fifteen (15) BITs most of which 
were with European countries.266 The aftermath of that relationship led to the discovery 
that most of its BITs it had entered into hardly reckoned with its FDI policy or 
constitutional obligations of securing post-apartheid Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE).267  
The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Acts of parliament were 
enacted to reverse the anomalies and injustices that existed in South African society 
during the apartheid era.268 A key element to this economic strategy is the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA).269 The MPRDA 
constitutes a system based on administrative law commonly known to be a system of 
                                                                 
261Poulsen L N S (2011) 260. 
262 Poulsen L N S (2011) 261. 
263 Marais H South Africa Limits to Change: The political Economy of Transition (2001) 122. 
264 Marais H (2001) 122. 
265 Poulsen L N S (2011) 260 
266 Lang J & Giffillan B ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties- A Shield or a Sword? Available at 
www.bowmanslaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/PPI-article_mailshot_08112013_1038389_1-
1.pdf (accessed 06 December 2018).  
267 Rolland S E (2017) 393. 
268 Coleman M & William K (2008) 60. 
269 Coleman M & William K (2008) 57 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 
 
51 
 
licences.270 The terms of references in the Act enables amongst others the mining 
companies to hold ‘a limited real right in land’ and gives them the prospect of mining 
minerals against payment of royalties to the state.271 Kron reckons that the MPRDA 
objectives are to consolidate the mineral rights of South Africa to be in line with the 
provision of the constitution as well as to enable the state to fulfil its constitutional role 
as custodian of the nation’s mineral wealth on behalf of the people of South Africa.272 
The introduction of this Act became the centre of controversy in the Foresti v Republic 
of South Africa273 case brought before the ICSID on the 8 January 2007.This case was 
registered by the Italian and Luxembourg investors alleging that South Africa had 
violated its obligations to the BITs it has with Italy ‘The Italian BIT’ and the Benelux 
States ‘The Benelux BIT’.274 The claims were premised on South Africa Minerals and 
Petroleum Recourses Development Act, a law that required holders of older rights to 
convert to the new mineral rights.275 The claimants alleged that through this legislation, 
investors risk the chance of recouping the true economic value of their assets and may 
never recover their full mineral rights.276 Part of the ANC BEE economic strategy 
requirements was for companies to transfer twenty six percent ownership sold at fair 
market value to historically disadvantaged South Africans by 2014 as a precursor to 
mining rights renewal.277 The claimants argued that these requirements were not 
economically viable and therefore constituted an indirect expropriation, violation of the 
fair and equitable treatment as well as national treatment obligations of its BITs.278 The 
uproar resulted in diplomatic intervention with the Italian Embassy in Pretoria 
submitting an ‘Aide Memoire’ to the Government of South Africa setting forth Italy’s 
concerns on BEE legislation and its support for its investors. 279 It became apparent 
that the Italian investors would institute an arbitration claim against the government of 
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South Africa because Italy viewed the mineral Act as a ‘significant and deleterious 
effect on Italian investor’s investments in Southern African Mining industry’.280The 
aftermath of this action resulted in arbitration claims against SA challenging certain 
aspects of its BEE polices.281 
South Africa responded by arguing that the measures taken by the state were not 
expropriation because there was no total loss of rights over minerals consequently the 
actions taken by government represents a rational and proportional government 
regulation.282They further contended with concluding comments that the measures 
were lawful and for public purposes, that compensation accorded were fair and 
adequate, decisions were non-discriminatory and carried out under due process of the 
law following the MPRDA procedures.283 Research done by TNI (The Transnational 
Institute) also suggest that the decision made by SA to cancel its BITs is based on the 
assessment done by the country affirming that BIT protection was incompatible with 
SA national development objectives.284 Further claims reveal that the BIT/ISDS 
framework limits the state ability to protect the environment from mining companies or 
shield the economies from harmful financial flow.285 More so the result suggest that 
there is not enough evidence to demonstrate that BITs lead to more investment in 
partner countries where treaties are in force.286  
The Foresti case proved that in spite the benefits of BITs to FDI, it could also be used 
as a tool for costly litigation against the state. This prompted Poulsen to suggest that 
the SA position on fundamental policy issues had the potential to trigger similar legal 
claims questioning the re-distribution efforts of the post-apartheid government.287 In 
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summarising the concluding argument, the case was settled outside the arbitration 
tribunal following an agreement between parties.288 The year 2010 marked a historical 
moment in international investment law in SA when the Italian investors eventually 
withdrew their case as they managed to negotiate other favourable terms with SA 
mining regulators.289 These terms required SA to confer new mining rights to the 
investors while investors requested to discontinue arbitration proceedings against the 
state.290 
The relevance of BITs and its overall challenges to the SA political and legislative 
arena can also be traced back to 2001.291 Poulsen referred to this as the first known 
situation where investors invoked the BIT against the government of South Africa.292 
This era was characterised by the bill passed by the SA government through its 
parliamentary committee recommending that the government regulate five thousand 
odd companies in the security industry.293 According to contemporaneous news report, 
the private security industry, one of the largest in the world, with its people, power and 
access to weapons posed a threat to the national security of the country.294A 
commentator from the economist further escalated the issue by narrating that ‘foreign 
firms will be kicked out’.295 This statement sparked international attention due to the 
earlier comments by an ANC stalwart saying;  
‘There will be no role for foreign companies. All security companies in South Africa 
must be owned and run and controlled by South Africans’.296 
The proposed legislation encountered stiff opposition from the foreign investors in the 
aforementioned industry, most especially the British government.297 Following a 
lengthy and vigorous negotiation between foreign investors and their home 
                                                                 
288 Sheffer M W ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or a Foe to Human Rights?’39 Denver Journal 
of International Law & Policy 499. 
289 Poulsen L N S (2011) 269. 
290 Sheffer M W (2011) 499. 
291 Poulsen L N S (2011) 263. 
292 Poulsen L N S (2011) 263. 
293 The Economist ‘South African Security companies: An Industry Hi jacked’ (2001) available at 
https://www.economist.com/business/2001/10/04/an-industry-hijacked (accessed o3 December 2018).  
294 Peterson L E ‘South Africa’s Bilateral Investment Treaties: Implications For Developments and 
Human Rights’ (2006) 15 
295 The Economist ‘South African Security companies: An Industry Hijacked’ (2001) available at 
https://www.economist.com/business/2001/10/04/an-industry-hijacked (accessed 03 December 2018).  
296 The Economist ‘South African Security companies: An Industry Hijacked’ (2001) available at 
https://www.economist.com/business/2001/10/04/an-industry-hijacked (accessed 03 December 2018).  
297 Peterson L E (2006) 15. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 
 
54 
 
government, the British government relentlessly raised fierce objections indicating that 
any such measures would breach the BIT between the two countries.298 The 
arguments were eventually won by the foreign owned security companies hence the 
SA government summarily dismissed their position stating that the actions were 
ludicrous and would adversely affect the security industry which brings approximately 
two billion rand a year to the SA economy.299 Though a BIT claim was not instituted, 
nevertheless the government felt it was the right thing to do.300 As this unforeseen 
events unfolded, SA realised the need for government immediate intervention in 
understanding investment agreements and uses especially in the context of dispute 
settlement between investor and the state. 
With reference to the above mentioned events on developments in international 
investment law, it became inextricable for the government of South Africa to re-
evaluate its position to BITs with its treaty partners. Gordon’s macro-analysis on 
‘drivers of countries re-evaluation of investment treaty law’ suggested that countries 
taking up the responsibility of protecting investors and managing legal risk for treaty 
partners, will as a matter of importance consider the self-interest of the country’s 
developmental stage on whether it’s a ‘capital exporting or capital importing or a bit of 
both’.301 They also argued that experience from lessons learned from treaty based 
claims necessitated the need for government intervention in re-evaluation of certain 
treaty practices.302 As such, the legal implications to experiences acquired as 
respondents in ISDS cases would warrant a total realignment of treaty 
commitments.303 Be that as it may, ‘empirical study of BIT negotiations shows that 
having been a respondent in a treaty-based claim is a strong, statistically significant 
predictor of countries’ BIT renegotiation activity’.304 
In the wake of the controversy engulfed around the first generation BITs, the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) embarked on a mission to review South 
                                                                 
298 Poulsen L N S (2011) 263. 
299 Poulsen L N S (2011) 264. 
300 Poulsen L N S (2011) 264. 
301Gordon K & Pohl J ‘Investment Treaties Over Time-Treaty Practice and Interpretation in a Changing 
World’ (2015) OECD Publishing 9. 
302Gordon & Pohl J (2015) 9. 
303 Gordon & Pohl J (2015) 10. 
304 Gordon & Pohl J (2015) 11. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 
 
55 
 
Africa’s BITs.305 In June 2009, the DTI was of the opinion that the first generation BITs 
post 1994 were allegedly skewed to the investor.306 The department therefore arrived 
at the following conclusions first, that the BITs invaded the policy space of the 
government’s development plan, lacking necessary safeguards to preserve flexibility, 
secondly, as part of government’s mandate to promote trade and investment, BITs 
sometimes allowed legal and business communities to challenge regulatory changes, 
which government consider to be in public interest.307 In support of these conclusions, 
Carim argues that IIAs and the ISDS system are perceived as being biased towards 
the interest of investors as opposed to government and the overall concerns of the 
society.308 Although included in BITs are sunset clauses spanning between ten to 
fifteen years, the government of SA undertook a policy to review all its first generation 
BITs that were approaching their expiring date.309 Interestingly this measure offered 
the government an opportunity to address inconsistencies and overlaps and the ability 
to update their investment protection to be consistent with the global trend on 
international investment law.310 
The pre 94 political landscape of SA marred by exclusionary policies experienced 
deeply rooted inequalities along racial lines that marginalised communities resulting in 
what is best known as Historically Disadvantaged South Africans (HDSA). The post –
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apartheid constitution thereafter is often commended as one of the best in the world 
for its strong assertion on human rights.311 Inscribed in the constitution is the 
transformation agenda prescribed to address socio-economic inequalities among its 
citizens.312 It also categorically addresses issues around non-discrimination between 
foreign and domestic investors taking into consideration that all investors operate 
within the context of the transformation agenda set forth by the constitution.313 One of 
the main challenges invading the policy space was the risk associated with imprecise 
legal commitments, notably the shortcomings in international arbitration in investor-
state dispute settlement which are subject to unpredictable international arbitration 
outcomes.314 Extensive studies by various groups including the government came to 
the conclusion that there are several inconsistencies between BITs and the 
constitution of RSA,315 which prompted the review process of BITs in 2008.316 The 
achievements of this intervention precipitated a legal and policy framework that learns 
from lessons of the past in resolving the challenges of sustainable socio-economic 
growth.317 
The process of terminating long standing European BITs signed before the new 
constitution in SA started in 2010.318 The decision to review in view to terminate ‘first 
generation’ BITs was taken by the South African cabinet noting with concern that the 
investor state dispute settlement mechanism (ISDS) recommended might be a 
challenge.319 The government through its spokesperson from the department of trade 
and industry said; 
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‘The South African government recognises that it has an investment protection legal 
framework in place that matches world’s standards and that the risk posed by BITs 
vastly outweigh their purported benefits’.320 
An overhaul was inevitable and the government of SA took a bold step of restructuring 
its BITs in addressing its social, economic, environmental and developmental 
challenges by the proposing the Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill.  
The focus of this thesis however should not be misconstrued as taking a position on 
whether the decision by South Africa is fundamentally right or wrong in its re-
evaluation of its international investment law. It only tries to establish from its own 
perspective, the adverse effect of BITs vis a vis the argument to reconsider 
renegotiating the treaty obligations with other developed and developing countries. 
3.4 Overview of the South Africa Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015  
 
The first protection of investment Bill to be introduced for public comment in SA was 
in November 2013.321 This was the first of its kinds to correct the inconsistencies the 
country experienced in the signing of its post 94 BITs. The interactions from various 
intra-governmental legal and policy organisations, departments and civil society led to 
the compilation of this Bill for public commentary.322 The Bill was understood not to 
introduce any new restrictions nevertheless it clarifies the non-discriminatory 
protection offered to all foreign investors and their investments respectively.323 The 
introduction of the Bill was prompted by the Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and Others 
v The Republic of South Africa Case No. ARB (AF)/07/1324 as a prelude to the 
government review of its investment laws and regulations.325 Recapping on the case, 
the international investors raised concerns about SA BEE policy in the mining industry 
and its effect on foreign investment in the country, which sparked international criticism 
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thus leading to international arbitration326 At the time the first Bill was introduced, SA 
had simultaneously embarked on terminating its BITs with various countries known to 
have previously controlled their investment regime.327 These included BITs with 
Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands which were duly served a notice to 
termination between 2011 and 2014 as part of the government’s effort to re-calibrate 
its international policy space.328 Following the decisions by the cabinet, these three 
treaties were given top priority because they were subject to automatic renewal 
clauses meaning if not terminated, would extend based on the agreed run-off 
periods.329 
The draft bill known as the ‘Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill (PPIB)’ was 
designed to provide investors with more latitude in protecting their investment through 
domestic laws as opposed to the initial referral to international arbitration.330 The main 
objective of the bill was to align its international investment agreements with South 
Africa’s constitutional principles.331 The preamble of the bill re-affirms South Africa’s 
commitments to creating an enabling investment environment for foreign investors in 
an open and transparent manner that supports sustainable development and the right 
to international human right.332 It further espouses the development of ‘material 
economic investments’ aimed at balancing the social inequalities within the legislative 
framework of the state as an ‘enterprise-based’ economy.333 The national treatment 
standard ensures that all foreign investors are accorded the same protection in like 
circumstances as their local counterparts and mandates the government to exercise 
its powers in redressing inequalities and upholding the rights guaranteed in the 
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constitution.334 In so doing, the government tackles social and economic inequalities 
by enforcing its policy on BEE without contravening the national treatment standard.335 
The provisions on expropriation and compensation are defined in line with section 25 
of the constitution of South Africa.336 Expropriation is deemed appropriate and 
applicable in situations where it is done for public purposes or for the interest of the 
public.337 The bill clarifies that expropriation is subject to compensation and should be 
just and equitable.338 On the other hand, it stresses that it is at the discretion of the 
court to determine a fair value for compensation after it has assessed each case in 
light of the legislative objective of public interest.339 This means that market value will 
not be considered for compensation but an amount that is just and equitable which is 
in line with the tenets of the constitution.340 
The draft bill triggered a political uproar from several stakeholders however 
promulgation of this bill after an arduous task of consultations and compilation was 
imminent.341  
On the 22 July 2015, the bill was formally introduced to the national assembly titled  
‘Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill’ however it was later promulgated in its 
final form on 15 December 2015 as an Act of parliament with a new title ‘Protection of 
Investment Act 22 of 2015’.342 
3.4.1 Interpretation of specific provisions of the Protection of Investment Act 
22 of 2015  
 
The Act begins with an introductory note defining the purpose (therein Article IV a full 
description of the purpose of the Act) as well as a preamble describing the rights, 
responsibilities, obligations, regulations and commitments of the Government to the 
                                                                 
334 Mossallam M (2015) 13. 
335 Mossallam M (2015) 13. 
336 Carim X (2016) 63. 
337 Carim X (2016) 63. 
338 Mossallam M (2015) 14. 
339 Mossallam M (2015) 14. 
340 Farish A ‘Protection of Investment Act- a Balancing Act between Policies and Investments’ available 
at www.derebus.org.za/protection-investments-act-balancing-act-policies-investments/ (accessed 18 
December 2018). 
341 Gazzini T ‘Rethinking the Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investments:  The 2015 South Africa’s 
Protection of Investment Act’ (2017) Social Science Research Network  4. 
342 Gazzini T (2017) 5. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 
 
60 
 
Republic in protection of persons, categories of persons historically disadvantaged in 
the republic, human rights and the peoples resources. It also highlights however not 
exhaustively, the importance of the protection of foreign investor and their investments 
in the republic. The Act is primarily modelled like the traditional BITs both substantially 
and procedurally but differ in certain regards to its approach.343 It comprises of sixteen 
(16) sections divided in structures with the last three on practical matters and 
transitional arrangements.344 
I. General provisions 
 
The Chapeau of the POI Act provides a statement that embraces the objectives of the 
government in protecting and not discriminating between ‘local and foreign’ investors 
and their investments in achieving a balance of rights and obligations of all 
stakeholders,345 in integrating its public policy objectives. The term stakeholders refer 
to investors, investments, government and civil society. It reads; 
‘To provide for the protection of investors and their investments; to achieve a balance 
of rights and obligations that apply to all investors; and to provide for matters connected 
therewith.’346 
The preamble aims to satisfy the requirement of the Department of Trade and 
Investment (DTI) BIT policy review to incorporate specific languages that emphasises 
its policy objectives of ‘inclusiveness’ rather than centralising definitions specifically 
around investment protection alone.347 
The Act categorically defines Investment in three spheres, emphasising the nature by 
which it is constituted i.e. by enterprise, financial instruments of payments and 
acquisition and cooperation of interest held by the enterprise. Article 2(1) of the Act 
states that an investment is; 
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(a) Any lawful enterprise established, acquired or expanded by an investor in 
accordance with the laws of the Republic, committing resources of 
economic value over a reasonable period of time, in anticipation of profit; 
(b) The holding or acquisition of shares, debentures or other ownership 
instruments of such an enterprise; or  
(c) The holding, acquisition or merger by such an enterprise with another 
enterprise outside the Republic to the extent that such holding, acquisition 
or merger with another enterprise outside the Republic, has an effect on an 
investment contemplated by paragraphs (a) and (b) in the Republic.348 
Gazzini argues that the definition of investment makes no reference to contributing to 
the economic development of the host state, citing in retrospect that several arbitral 
tribunals have considered it instrumental as an additional requirement for the purpose 
of giving a clearer indication to the definition of investment as proposed.349 As such, 
the definition of investment should incorporate the fundamental essence of 
developmental issues stressing the need for contributing towards sustainable 
development to the host state with the underlining characteristics common to 
investments as listed by the Act. 
The Act provides a blanket definition of an investor in section 1 as ‘an enterprise 
making an investment in the republic regardless of nationality’.350 It disregards 
nationality as a determining factor of an investor in as much as these investments are 
incorporated in the RSA by nationals or legal persons,351 making the Act non-
discriminatory. For this reason, it can be concluded that the brief definition of an 
investor satisfies the purpose it represents in similar international investment treaties, 
however for the purpose of international arbitration, the nationality of foreign investo r 
as defined by the treaty is of outmost importance.352 
Section 3 of the Act deals with the interpretation of the Act which should be done in 
light of the constitution. It states that the Act shall be interpreted in three spheres 
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namely its purposes highlighted in section 4, the constitution with specific reference to 
the Bill of Rights and lastly any relevant convention or international agreement to which 
South Africa is a signatory.353 In terms of the purpose in section 4, the Act protects 
investments by balancing public interest and the rights and obligations of investors in 
accordance with the constitution, secondly, it upholds the sovereign right of the 
republic to regulate investments in a manner that will protect public interest. Lastly, it 
ensures that all investors and investments in the republic are subject to the laws 
guided by the Bill of Rights which are applicable to all. All three spheres therewith are 
governed by section 39, 232 and 233 of the Constitution respectively.  
Section 39 of the Constitution provides an overview of the duties of the court, tribunal 
or forum in interpreting the Bill of Rights. This includes promoting values that 
demonstrates transparency in a democratic society based on dignity, equality and 
freedom whilst considering international law and other foreign law.354 Secondly in 
interpreting legislation, the above mentioned institutions must promote the spirit, 
purport and object of the Bill of Rights.355 Section 232 expresses conditions under 
which customary international law will be applicable within the South African legal 
system. It thus states that for the law to be applicable, it must be consistent with the 
constitution of South Africa or the Act of parliament.356 Unless consistent, such law will 
not be applicable in the South Africa.357 It becomes more interesting in that the Act 
adopts certain elements of customary international law which are well embedded in 
the constitution and are thus permissible within South African legal system. Section 
233 of the Constitution states; 
‘When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable 
interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any 
alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.’358 
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Under this provision, the court will first take into consideration whether the international 
law is binding to South Africa. Where the international law is directly in conflict or 
inconsistent with the Bill of Right, the court will deny its application domestically.359  
II. Review of other Protection Clauses in SA POI Act 
 
Section 6 of the POI Act ensures that the government operate within the ambit of the 
constitution to accord all investors the right to administrative treatment which is 
consistent with its obligations to provide administrative, legislative and judicial 
processes that do not operate arbitrarily or denies administrative and procedural 
justice to investors and their investments. This seems like a deliberate move to deviate 
from the traditional coding of the general treatment entrusted in traditional BITs but 
offers a similar treatment in like circumstances such as the right to administrative 
decision making as regards their investments, right to access of information in a timely 
manner, the right to dispute settlement and the application of law to be decided fairly 
in a public hearing before a court.  
Note this provision somewhat replicates the procedural treatment in traditional BITs, 
nevertheless it is a bold attempt to interpret the FET prescribed by customary 
international law found in conventional BITs. The POI Act attempts to satisfy the 
requirements accorded by BITs but falls short in legal interpretation thus creating a 
vacuum for uncertainties. As such, the uncertainty envisaged could potentially be an 
avenue for investor exploitation therefore future recommendation will require more 
content to the FET standard in terms of equitable treatment to investor as guaranteed 
by customary international law.  
Section 8 is a reflection of the measures put in place as a result of the Foresti360 case. 
It expresses the importance of NT obligations to the protection of foreign investors and 
their investment by the SA authorities. It stresses the notion of ‘like circumstances’ 
and the conditions under which they must be accorded to foreign investments. 
Fortunately, the Act omits the MFN treatment totally. Such initiative is good and 
demonstrates the country’s ability to prevent investors from invoking other treaties in 
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https://section27.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Chapter5.pdf (accessed 21 January 2019). 
 
360 Piero Foresti, Laura De Carli and others v Republic of South Africa ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/07/1. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 
 
64 
 
dispute settlement. Despite the limitations and scope of NT standard in like 
circumstances and the exemption expressed by the Act to cater for South Africans, 
the provision of this section seems to be inspired by the requirements of the ‘freedom 
charter’ which states that;  
‘The natural wealth of our country, heritage of South Africans, shall be restored to the 
people.’361 
From the analysis, it is of no doubt that this provision is consistent with the constitution 
of South Africa but inconsistent with the requirements of the conventional BITs which 
is good for sustaining the investor relationship with the republic. 
Section 9 is no different from the model BIT as it accords protection of physical security 
of property to foreign investors and their investment as their local counterparts as 
obligated by the minimum standard of treatment of customary international law. 
However the Act goes a bit further taking into consideration conditions of availability 
and capacity as a prerequisite to the treatment. Section 10 enshrines the right to legal 
protection of property as guaranteed and safeguarded under section 25 of the 
constitution. It is in the interest of transparency and accountability that funds 
accumulated in a sovereign state are taxed accordingly. The Act ensures that funds 
accumulated can be repatriated accordingly as far as it subject to taxation and other 
applicable legislation. 
Section 13 of the POI Act sets out processes and procedures for invoking dispute 
resolution by the foreign investor. Section 13 (1) of the Act permits investors to seek 
recourse upon request in response to any action taken by government which directly 
or indirectly affects the operations of the foreign investment, through the relevant 
department. Time frame for such request may be within six months of acknowledging 
a violation and a written submission may be made to the DTI. On request, the 
department will facilitate dispute settlement mechanisms through mediation by 
appointing a mediator. Section 13 (2) (a) empowers the department to collate a list of 
individuals with high moral standards and competence in law, commerce, industry or 
finance capable of exercising their discretion independently to oversee the mediation 
process.  
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In agreement by both parties namely ‘foreign investor and government’, section 13(2) 
(b) authorises both parties to nominate a candidate listed by the department. 
Thereafter, the investor may approach any competent South African court, 
independent tribunal or statutory body to adjudicate dispute settlement. If no resolution 
is agreed upon by both parties, the Act allows the investor to seek recourse in 
international arbitration subject to exhaustion of all domestic remedies in the republic. 
This process may be concluded in international arbitration requiring the consent from 
the government of SA and the commitments from the home state of the investor.  
Be that as it may, certain inconclusive arguments which remain vague may be raised 
with regards to this section. They include amongst others the question of time. It is 
known that adjudication takes time, therefore the time frame given for mediation might 
be too short and requires an extension to cater for proper consultations and plausible 
agreement.  
3.5 Recapping on Section 25 of the Constitution of South Africa 
 
South African disadvantaged communities have suffered decades of oppression from 
oppressors prior to the attainment of independence in 1994. In recent time, due to the 
inequality and the economic slowdown, there has been a fresh attempt by government 
to redistribute land belonging to the elite minority at fair price that is just and equitable. 
In addressing these challenges, compulsory purchases of land to redress the recurring 
racial disparities in land ownership has warranted the government of South Africa to 
redistribute land.362 In order to understand this redistributive process, it is paramount 
to highlight Section 25(1) (2) of the Constitution of South Africa. It reads; 
‘No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no 
law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.  
Subsection 2 which forms the focus of the discussion states that; 
 ‘Property may be expropriated only in terms of the law of general application 
(a) For a public purpose or in the public interest; and  
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(b) Subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment 
of which have either been agreed to by those affected of decided or approved by a 
court.’363 
The Constitution prohibits ‘arbitrary deprivation of property’ and categorically states 
that in subsection 2. Two main exceptions whereby property may be expropriated are 
for public purpose or public interest.364 While the debate for expropriation has 
intensified in recent years, the government alleges that the redistribution exercise is 
based on the premise to rectify the past wrongs and to provide opportunities to the 
previously excluded.365 A new narrative emerged calling for the ‘expropriation of land 
without compensation’ thereby sparking uproar within the international investors 
classifying these actions as violations of the South Africa international treaties. 
Commentators from the economics fraternity and farming groups have warned that 
the proposals malign investments and productions at a time when South Africa is 
emerging from a major drought, citing economic damages linked to farm seizures in 
neighbouring Zimbabwe and the resultant backlash from the west.366 Amidst all this 
controversy, the SA ruling party African National Congress (ANC), on the back of the 
upcoming elections promised to accelerate the redistribution plans to accommodate a 
vast majority of the marginalised communities.367 While the world watch in anticipation 
of this changes, South Africa still remains an investment hub for many within the 
international investment fraternity. 
3.5.1 Birth of a new dawn (The Expropriation Bill of 2016) 
 
The much anticipated land Bill which has attracted so much criticism since its debut at 
the beginning of 2013,368 referred to as ‘Expropriation Bill’ was finally approved by 
parliament  on the 26 May 2016 and currently awaiting the president’s signature.369 
The Bill which is intended ‘ to provide for the expropriation of property for a public 
                                                                 
363 Section 25 (1) (2) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
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purpose or in the public interest and to provide for matters connected therewith’370set 
into motion a debate which will transform the landscape of land reforms within the 
South African legal system. 
Law experts and commentators Marais and Slade argue that the approach taken by 
government follows a similar pattern of jurisdiction in countries like United States, 
Germany and Ireland, therefore unlikely to pose a threat to investors’ 
confidence.371Further comments reveals that the Bill may not limit or take away 
property arbitrarily owning claim to section 25(2) which allows the state to expropriate 
property only for public purposes and public interest realising land and related reforms 
as permitted by section 25(4a).372 These powers enable the government to initiate 
compulsory acquisition of property from affected owners without permission, hence 
the state must exercise its powers within the confines of the law.373 
Van Zyk maintained that the proposed Bill provides for the expropriation of property of 
an owner and unregistered rights of the holder.374 The author gives more meaning to 
the narrative by asserting that ‘expropriation of property’ referred to that contemplated 
in section 25 of the Constitution, the ‘owner’ as the person in whose name the property 
or right is registered and ‘unregistered rights of holder’ as an occupier of land which is 
recognised and protected by law but is neither registered nor required to be 
registered.375 In proposing a full assessment of the Bill, Van Zyk argues that the overall 
purpose of the Bill, is to determine whether the Bill constitutes an amount that is ‘just 
and equitable’ in compensation and if it will be acquired in a timely manner.376  
The expropriation Bill as proposed can be seen in three spheres namely investigation, 
service of notice of intention to expropriate and notice of expropriation. These 
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procedures will have to be strictly adhered to before expropriation is determined. Van 
Zyk concludes that land reforms remain a topical discourse the government have 
hardly succeeded in, nevertheless, reliance on new legislation to dislodge the ‘willing 
buyer willing seller’ will be an arduous task, requiring amendments in the expropriation 
Bill to accommodate these lapses.377  
Slade’s discussions on the impact of the expropriation Bill concluded on a similar note 
on the difficulty in applying the tenets of the Bill by the courts. The argument suggest 
that the basis to expropriate property in line with the proposed procedures may inter 
alia restrict the courts ability to award compensation in a potential expropriation 
dispute.378 This could be as a result of legislative inadequacy authorising expropriation 
and a detachment from the expropriation procedures set out in the Bill which were not 
followed.379 
The discussions above have highlighted the position of various scholars to the 
expropriation Bill. At the time of the writing of this thesis, the Bill is yet to be signed 
into law by the President of the RSA. It is however the position of many that the task 
ahead for amendments remains a difficult one, therefore the impact on foreign 
investment as a result of this Bill could be classified speculatively as retrogressive. 
This paper have discussed various dynamics but its major objective is to determine 
the impact of these factors not to question if the Bill is right or wrong. Further research 
will unveil the potential benefit or threats to international investment law. 
3.6 Merits of the Protection of Investment Act and its attractiveness to FDI 
 
Protection of Investment in any given sovereignty remains the sole responsibility of 
the state to design sound legislative framework for the protection of all investments, 
be it foreign/domestic in pursuance of its constitutional obligation. This commitments 
are well enshrined in the section 12 of the Act, communicating the right to regulate in 
accordance with the constitution and applicable legislation. 
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International law subscribes to two claims both of which are based on the state 
sovereignty, they include ‘protection of persons and property of aliens’.380 These rights 
are guaranteed in the SA POI Act and can be cited in section 9 and 10 respectively. 
Section 9 alludes to the type of physical security which must meet the minimum 
standard of customary international law depending on the availability of resources and 
capacity. In terms of the legal protection, section 10 aligns its obligation to section 25 
of the Constitution which is subject to amendments and a threat to foreign investment 
in the country. 
While the number of States revisiting their international treaties are on the increase, it 
is unbecoming for several others to conclude new BITs.381 The UNCTAD 2018 report 
indicates that 2017 experienced the lowest IIAs concluded.382 On the other hand, 
effective treaty terminations increased outpacing the newly concluded IIAs.383 The 
report anticipates a positive investment outlook for Africa in 2018 with the interregional 
cooperation through the signing of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA)384 
agreement which could galvanise a stronger FDI inflow into Africa.385  
Many have suggested that there is no clear evidence to show that investment treaties 
increase the inflow of foreign investment,386 rather states are pushing for facilitation 
agreement which generally advocates for judicial and arbitral proceedings that 
supports the host state through exhaustion of domestic remedies as opposed to 
international arbitration in dispute settlement.387 At this point, claims cannot be credited 
to the South Africa POI Act as attracting new investments however with the ongoing 
developments in the ACFTA and the proposed expropriation Bill, SA is yet to 
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experiencing more interesting time in future negotiations within the international 
investment landscape. 
3.7 Risk inherent in the POI Act 
 
Experts have expressed concerns over certain elements of the POI Act which may 
jeopardise the country’s ability to attract foreign investors. Commentators from law 
firms expressed concerns reiterating that the Act limits the possibility of investors 
claiming compensation thereby subjecting every claim to a ‘just and equitable 
compensation’ rather than ‘full market value’.388 The Act unequivocally defends this 
expression in section 12 (1) by providing a list of measures which addresses the 
constitutional rights of the citizens of the republic and must be done in accordance 
with the constitution of South Africa. Subject to the just and equitable compensation 
and the argument that it may deter foreign investors, Williams Randall concurs that 
the most important determinant of FDI is the ‘market size’ of the proposed economy.389 
This amongst other factors is ranked first in hierarchy above ‘legal certainty’ which 
comes last in the value chain.390 Be that as it may, investors will pay more attention on 
the fact that funds can be transferred freely without necessarily going through the 
difficulties of cumbersome legislative processes and tax barriers before repatriation 
takes effect. For most investment, ease in return of capital, tax breaks and a functional 
domestic institutions including the judicial institutions drives the desire to invest in any 
given state. 
Another risk associated with the POI Act is the dispute resolution process 
recommended. The Act recognises the exhaustion of local remedies through domestic 
legislation but distances itself from international arbitration. Its position is anchored on 
the premise that domestic legislation is more appropriate than international legal 
instrument in regulating foreign investment.391 The risk however lies in the 
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amendments of legal rules by the domestic legislator which might affect the foreign 
investor leading to costly litigation cases.392 Treaties on the other hand requires the 
consent of the parties involved which in practical terms brings some kind of relief to 
the foreign investor.393 The Act does not operate in isolation. It is rigidly anchored to 
the constitution which can be amended but only through very complex procedures.394 
For that reason, it mitigates exposures to uncertainty and instability while 
constitutionally providing legal backing to foreign investment.395 
Omission of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause limits the treatment accorded to 
foreign investment however shield the SA investment arena especially those 
investments established after the POI Act. The primary aim of the Act is to protect all 
investments and by incorporating the NT, investors are rest assured that all 
investments enjoy the same treatment in like circumstances. Some might argue that 
this position is short lived subsequently it may prompt new standards to be introduced 
as host nations rectifies their constitution.  
3.8 Recent outlook on SA Investment Climate 
 
The South African investment climate in recent times is experiencing significant 
changes in capital injection. Results indicate that from 2003 till date, Chinese 
companies have made over sixty nine billion Rands of capital investment into various 
sectors of the economy.396  These are the automotive, electronics, metals, building 
and construction as well as the financial sector.397 Although the government’s position 
on foreign investment suggest improvements, alternative research conducted by other 
companies articulate at a different conclusion. 
The central question will then be has BITs or the SA POI generally demonstrated a 
change in dynamics of foreign investments in Africa? With the striking difference in 
elements from both approaches, is there a common ground for the future of 
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international investment agreements? The answers are not far-fetched in that these 
instruments have contributed to securing investors’ confidence in various capital-
importing countries in Africa. It is incumbent however, for both host and home 
countries to develop strategies that aligns to their developmental needs by creating 
investor friendly agreements that caters for all that operate within the given 
sovereignty. More to this will be discussed in the proceeding chapter. 
3.8.1 Institutional reports on foreign investment in South Africa 
 
B & M analysts suggest that since 2014, local companies invested more outside the 
country than foreign companies did in SA.398 According to the report, various factors 
could have contributed to this namely poverty, crime, infrastructure, workforce, natural 
security, political instability, regime uncertainty, taxes, and rule of law, property rights, 
government regulation, government transparency and accountability.399  
The World Bank analysis on doing business in South Africa 2018 suggest positivity in 
institutional reforms however these conditions can be improved by national 
government.400 In spite of the selective indicators used, the report claims significant 
improvement in services rendered, aided by working institutions. Legal services on the 
other hand remained unchanged at a record low since 2015 suggesting the need for 
an improvement in levels of efficiency as compared to other upper-middle income 
economies.401 
Revisiting the UNCTAD report 2018 discussed earlier, FDI flows in Africa generally 
slumped by twenty one percent less than 2017.402 Claims to this suggest weakness in 
oil prices and harmful macroeconomic effects from commodity sales.403 SA was not 
spared within the global trend reporting negative growth in foreign investments citing 
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underperforming commodity sector and political uncertainty,404 which could also be 
attributed to the decline in investment in the republic. 
The general overview has not been too pleasant. Attributing the challenges 
experienced by the country to a single paradigm will not constitute good judgement. 
Be that as it may, recent development suggest that the country is working on new 
strategies and commitments to revamp its institutions with the nascent call by the 
president for structural, legislative and policy reforms in government institutions.405 
This position is closely watched by the international community. 
3.9 Chapter Conclusion 
 
After consulting different literature that focuses on the South African BIT regime and 
the review processes, it became apparent that an intervention would ensue. From the 
investigations presented, reviewing the BITs and the promulgation of the POI Act 
safeguards the Republic from costly litigation cases which might be prompted by 
various elements of the old BIT regimes. The POI Act addresses these challenges but 
falls short over concerns on the new Expropriation Bill which proposes expropriation 
without compensation. This is yet to be debated. Excluding the MFN clause from the 
POI Act brings some form of relief to the state in terms of parties invoking 
complimentary treaties in times of dispute settlement. In such situation, host states are 
able to protect themselves against costly litigation imposed by disgruntled investors. 
The next chapter performs a comparative study on both approaches from the 
perspective of both the foreign investor and the host state to the protection and 
promotion of investment in Africa. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SUGGESTED AFRICAN BITs AND THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN POI Act 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter highlights selected provisions on protection of investment in the BITs 
identified in contrast with the South African Protection of Investment (POI) Act. The 
Act specifically aims at protecting investment however is silent on promotion, 
nevertheless the overall purpose of this Act is to achieve a balance of rights and 
obligations to all investors in fostering economic growth and development within its 
territory.  
Final analysis will discuss dispute settlement as an important component of investment 
treaties in providing recourse to disputes emanating from international agreements 
and the challenges of the twenty first century. 
4.2 Common trends in selected African BITs and the South African POI Act 
 
The respective BITs under review discussed in earlier chapters are scripted in similar 
trends incorporating the substantive obligations which culminates as the heart of 
protecting foreign investors. These rights and obligations define the scope of treatment 
contracting parties provide as a reflection of their commitments to protection of foreign 
investment. For instance, each suggested BITs promotes investments by creating 
favourable conditions for investments in its territory for all investors and shall carry out 
these obligations in accordance with the agreement. The idea of promoting favourable 
conditions are all embedded in treatment standard provided by each individual treaty. 
For this study, emphasis will be paid to NT, MFN, Expropriation and Compensation, 
Minimum Standard of Treatment as well as Transfer of Profits. 
4.2.1 National Treatment (NT) under suggested African BITs and SA POI Act 
 
As a measure of fairness and equity in international business law, the NT standard 
ensures that foreign controlled enterprises in like circumstances expect treatment no 
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less favourable than that received by their domestic counterparts.406 Meaning equally 
competitive investment opportunities must be provided for both local and international 
companies operating within the same threshold by host nations. Special 
circumstances of each investor are taken into account when considering beneficiaries 
as most states may consider the economic condition of their nationals while extending 
such privileges to them.407 Such privileges given by host states deserves equal rights 
of establishment to be extended to foreign investors. For instance, programmes 
designed to help promote small and medium scale businesses in a host country cannot 
be extended to multinational companies. This is well articulated in the African BITs 
under analysis highlighting the areas where it applies i.e. ‘covered investment’ and the 
conditions for which they may apply ‘like circumstances’. Article 4 (2) Canada-Senegal 
(2014) BIT states; 
‘Each Party shall accord to a covered investment treatment no less favourable than 
that it accords, in like circumstances, to investment of its own investor… .’408 
This term ‘like circumstances’ is often used in trade related cases however the major 
challenge with the term is determining the limits for which it applies in NT.409 Hence it 
is construed as meaning ‘similar situations’ giving a better understanding to situations 
of applicability. The SA POI Act ‘national treatment’ clause in addressing like 
circumstances takes into account to include affirmative measures to redress historical 
injustices faced by the black population.410 In other words it gives local firms 
preferential treatment as indicated in section 8 (4) subsection (1) stating  
‘must not be interpreted in a manner that will require the Republic to extend to foreign 
investors and their investments the benefit of any treatment, preference or privilege 
resulting from… .’411 
Such measures were specifically designed to address the imbalances experienced in 
the past which at the time of the drafting of the constitution were of paramount 
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importance to the overall development of the country. South Africa has chosen to limit 
the right to NT to foreign investors operating in “like circumstances” to South African 
investors in their business operations. The outlook of this approach in its application 
is not problematic, but the description given to like circumstances by the Act in Section 
8 (2) (a) to (g) may create problems. 
Section 8 (2) does not define “like circumstances”, but calls for an overall, case by 
case examination on the merits of all the terms of the foreign investment which in 
general are wide and vague invoking different interpretations to different terms. The 
intention to protect the economy, local communities and the environment against the 
negative effect of investments in laudable, but the formulation of the criteria is not 
interpretable. As it stands, Section (2) would certainty create uncertainty amongst 
foreigner investors as to the standard of treatment they may expect and how this 
standard may differ between different sectors of the economy. Maintaining this 
standard in its interpretative form as stated in Article 4 (2) of the Canada-Senegal 
(2014) BIT requires simple applications to the listed categories. 
4.2.2 Observing the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Treatment in Suggested 
African BIT and the SA POI Act approach  
 
The MFN treatment forms the heart of the substantial requirements for the selected 
African BITs alongside the minimum standards of treatment as required by customary 
international law. Earlier jurisprudence suggest that in interpreting the meaning and 
scope of the MFN clause, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) relied on party’s 
intent, forming the basis of discourse in various BITs.412 Parker concurs in one of such 
cases with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.,413 where the ICJ held that in as much as the 
basic treaty and third party treaties are valid and in force, the claimant could invoke 
privileges extended to third parties treaties in matter of consular jurisdiction.414 As a 
prelude to most dispute settlement provisions, various arbitration clauses have 
internalised this clause and used it as part of the requirements in resolving disputes 
arising from breaches in bilateral investment treaties.415 It is therefore no surprise that 
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in most bilateral investment treaties, the MFN clause is applied to dispute settlement 
provision.416 This practice of invoking certain clauses from other treaties in dispute 
resolution more often than not lead to uncomfortable compromises in direction of the 
treaties sometimes prompting retaliatory economic measure from the other contracting 
party.417 Treaty shopping is not totally a new concept, it has been used in different 
ICSID cases in overriding certain provisions in other for contracting states to accord 
to investors of the other contracting state treatment that is no less favourable than that 
accorded to the investors of the third state.418 Such has been seen in the Maffezini 
case419 discussed earlier highlighting the dangers of invoking treaties which could be 
disruptive to the policy objectives of the underlying specific treaty provision in the 
applicable BIT.420 
On the other hand, the SA POI Act recognises the NT clause with emphasis on ‘like 
circumstances’ but rejects the adoption of the MFN treatment. The MFN treatment 
standard is not included in the SA POI Act. As indicated in the discussion on customary 
international law, this treatment standard is only relevant where treatment is awarded 
on the basis of nationality, and there is the possibility of differentiation between 
investors from different countries.421 This is not relevant in the POI Act as investment 
is defined irrespective of nationality. This clause would be potentially relevant should 
any future BITs be concluded.422   
The MFN clause clearly visible in suggested African BITs but omitted in SA POI Act, 
owes credence to a number of cases. Citing a few are the Maffezini v. Kingdom of 
Spain423 and the Piero Foresti v. Republic of South Africa424 discussed in chapter two 
and three respectively. It is without doubt that considering the issues around both 
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cases whether from lessons learnt from invoking other treaties or abiding to the 
sovereign laws of the land, it appeared inevitable that the interest of the country must 
come first. As one commentator suggested, the threat of the BIT could potentially 
compromise SA position with an unquantifiable cost.425 This is very true in areas of 
unlawful expropriation where the State directly or indirectly expropriate property of 
nationals or foreigners by nationalisation or enforcing other measures that constitute 
expropriation. It is of significant importance to note that the State is not totally 
prohibited from expropriating under customary international law, however it is 
established that the right of the State to expropriate is limited by certain conditions that 
must be satisfied.426  
4.2.3 Expropriation and Compensation 
 
Expropriation and compensation as indicated in BITs under analysis prohibits either 
party to nationalise or expropriate whether directly or indirectly in a manner that is 
close or equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation without compensating 
accordingly. Each BIT stresses conditions for which expropriation can take place i.e. 
for public purposes, non-discriminatory prompt payment and must be done in 
accordance with the due process of the law. Compensation therein must be equivalent 
to a fair market value and paid without delay in a fully realisable and freely transferable 
manner.  
Contrary to this the SA POI Act makes reference to section 25 of the constitution, 
which highlights expropriation and compensation and conditions under which these 
measures apply. Section 25 (2) of the Bill of Rights states; 
‘Property may be expropriated only in terms of the law of general application (a) for 
public purpose or in the public interest; and (b) subject to compensation, the amount 
of which and the time and manner of payment of which have either been agreed to by 
those affected or decided or approved by the court.’427 
The Constitution recognises the need to expropriate and as Sornarajah articulates, 
‘provided certain conditions are satisfied’.428 Those conditions include for public 
                                                                 
425 Poulsen L N S (2011) 268. 
426 Sornarajah M (2017) 245. 
427 Section 25 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.  
428 Sornarajah M (2017) 245. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 
 
79 
 
purposes or interest and subject to compensation in a timeous and prompt manner. 
Although one of the greatest threats to foreign investment is nationalisation,429 it is still 
within the ambit of customary international law to define what constitute nationalisation 
which SA has identified in its Constitution before for such measures are implemented. 
Reinforcing this area of customary international law by South African legislation proves 
not only that the laws are consistent with international standards, but also affirms 
South Africa’s commitments to protecting investments under international law. 
BITs generally do not provide a clear distinction between expropriation and 
deprivation.430 This may be construed as implying that expropriation is equivalent to 
deprivation thus compensation must apply.431 The constitution forbids arbitrary 
deprivation of property however expropriation can occur in terms of the law for public 
purposes and public interest. The amount to be paid for compensation must reflect the 
relevant circumstances as indicated in the constitution and must be just and equitable 
as opposed to fair market value depicted by BITs. This pronouncement from the 
constitution reflects on reversing the damages experienced by historically dis-
advantaged South Africans and encourages reforms to bring about equitable access 
to all South Africa’s natural resources.432 
While acknowledging the position of both approaches, an alternative position is to 
suggest that compensation takes place within the availability of resources of the host 
state and a fair market value as prescribed by BITs be administered in line with the 
present value of the expropriated property. In other words, developing nations in Africa 
should consider the present economic conditions while articulating similar positions 
taken in like circumstances by other developing nations within the continent and 
applying within their respective jurisdiction. . 
4.2.4 Full Protection and Security/ Physical Security of Property 
 
In terms of full protection and security, contracting parties are required to provide FET 
in accordance to the principles of international law.433 Defining the minimum standard 
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of treatment will depend on the parties concluding the establishment of the treaty, 
hence agreeing on the terms of its existence in relation to customary international 
law.434 Selected African BITs within the ambit of customary international law generally 
subscribes to this principle codifying it under minimum standard of treatment as FPS. 
The SA POI Act adopts a contrary approach to this. Section 9 refers to this treatment 
as ‘physical security of property’.435 It compels the Republic to accord investors and 
their investment such level of physical security as may be generally provided to 
domestic investors and subject to available resources and capacity. The Act drifts 
away from the traditional connotation as ‘full protection and security’ to a ‘level of 
physical security subject to available resources and capacity’.436 This provision makes 
it very clear that the government is retaining policy space to regulate in the public 
interest for purposes of equality and access to resources. These resources are limited 
and must be restricted to serve the needs of all investments. This is notably in 
accordance with customary international law and the stated objectives of the Act. 
In view of the complexity of interpreting this standard, the state’s ability to meet this 
standard is succinctly limited to the level of resources available. The more qualified 
level of protection provided for in Section 9 is therefore in line with recent international 
practice, and particularly the recommendations of the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD) that states must take control in relation to the FPS 
standard.437 South Africa is no exception to this provision as it subject herself to a level 
of physical security which is open to different interpretation considering the resources 
of the state at any given time. Perhaps as newer treaties have suggested, investor 
protection should apply only against violence to investment.438  
4.2.5 Transfer/ Transfer of Funds 
 
Another momentous standard present in selected BITs and the SA POI Act is the 
‘Transfer’ or ‘Transfer of Funds’ provisions which is very visible in both models. 
Apparently, no state operates in isolation therefore the need for foreign investment to 
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repatriate profits will depend on certain measures put in place by host States to 
facilitate the process of return.  
Section 11 of the SA POI Act confirms the incorporation of the provision. The Act 
provides that a foreign investor may, in respect of any investment, transfer funds, 
subject to taxation and other applicable legislation. This clause is entirely in line with 
customary international law, however, attention must be paid to times of economic 
difficulties experienced at any given time. In situation where extreme balance of 
payments surfaces, the state could invoke measures to suspend the treaty obligation 
to permit repatriation until such time when the economy recovers.439  
This stance is an ideal policy position adopted by most states however recommending 
a retaining profit policy will go a long way to guarantee confidence among foreign 
investors. This profits should be directed towards treaty policy objective of sustainable 
development in host countries. 
4.3 Dispute settlement approaches presented by both models 
 
Generally, the set of rules guiding international investments are enshrined in the 
arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission for International Trade law 
(UNCITRAL).These rules are mostly used in commercial arbitration in investor-state 
dispute settlement where documents submitted to arbitrators are confidential and 
closed to the public.440 
It is often alleged that transparency and accountability are far-fetched in most ISDS 
processes because of its strict adherence to confidentiality and access to information 
to the public,441 however in recent times, the UN pushed for more transparency 
through public hearing, access to documents submitted as well as ability for interested 
parties to make submissions to arbitration proceedings in investment dispute.442 The 
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role of the ISDS is to provide the international investor an opportunity to sue a country 
for alleged breaches of agreement in investment made in a host state.443 This may not 
be the case at all times for certain BITs tend to sway from this process to other forms 
of dispute settlement mechanisms. 
4.3.1 The selected African BIT approach 
 
In most cases, resolving disputes requires the international investor to bypass national 
courts seeking judicial remedies before the ICSID. Considering similar circumstances, 
others have subscribed to resolving disputes through diplomatic channels between 
countries. BITs usually contain an arbitration clause submitting disputes unilaterally to 
a neutral arbitration tribunal before the ICSID using the UNCITRAL arbitration rules,444 
however mere references to ICSID in treaties did not give jurisdiction over individual 
disputes to ICSID.445 In fact, with such jurisdiction in place will depend mainly on the 
precise textual reference incorporated in the treaty.446  In further analysis, this paper 
will identify the dispute mechanisms the African BITs share and where they differ.  
All selected African BIT states are signatories to the ICSID Convention and the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration rules however not all subscribe to the various forms of dispute 
settlement. The Morocco-Nigeria (2016) BIT recommends in Article 26 for disputing 
parties to seek negotiations and consultations before initiating any arbitration 
procedure.447 If disputes cannot be resolved within six months from date of request for 
consultations, the investor may proceed to international arbitration after exhausting 
local remedies of the host state.448 This further reveals the role of domestic courts as 
part of exhausting local remedies in dispute settlement. Articles 27 and 28 discuss the 
processes and procedures of the ISDS as a form of dispute settlement. It gives the 
investor the right to invoke international arbitration through the ICSID. The SSDS449 
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mechanism is excluded in this agreement meaning contracting parties recognises 
resolving dispute only by consultation while exhausting local remedies and the ISDS 
mechanism. 
The Japan-Kenya (2016) BIT narrative follows a similar approach seen earlier in the 
Morocco-Nigeria (2016) BIT. Article 15 recommends consultations between disputing 
parties while seeking judicial or administrative settlement within the area of 
investment.450 In other words, it recommends exhaustion of local remedies ‘at the 
choice of the disputing party’ meaning judicial recourse may be sought within the 
investment area at a competent court or administrative tribunal of the disputing party.  
Alternatively an investor may proceed with international arbitration in accordance with 
the ICSID invoking the UNCITRAL rules in quest for an amicable settlement. No 
mention of SSDS is recommended thus relying on the ISDS mechanism. 
The Canada-Senegal (2014) BIT first recognises the adoption of both dispute 
settlement mechanisms namely ISDS and SSDS. The incorporation of the State-to-
State arbitration is not new to investment treaty for SSDS predates Investor-State 
arbitration and commonly used in early investment treaties such as the friendship, 
commerce and navigation (FCN) treaties.451 Article 20 states; 
‘without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the Parties under Section D (State-
to-State Dispute Settlement Procedures), the Parties establish in this Section a 
mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes’.452 
Consultations are recommended for an amicable settlement before an investor may 
submit claim for arbitration. Nowhere was it suggested that national courts be 
approached to address disputing parties’ grievances however the treaty proposes 
consultations through diplomatic channels or ICSID. If all attempts fails, Article 22 
outlines the procedures in invoking a claim to international arbitration. The option of 
the SSDS in the treaty provides a diplomatic angle into resolving investment dispute 
between an investor and the host state. Experts argue that the approach offers 
possibilities for states to re-engage with the investment treaty system while contrary 
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opinion suggest that interstate arbitration may re-politicise investment dispute.453 
Whatever the case may be, it is in the interest of the parties to carefully reconsider all  
options by evaluating the risk and benefits of including both mechanisms454 or 
subscribing to one as seen in earlier BITs discussed in this thesis.  
4.3.2 The South African POI Approach 
 
Despite the debate over the impact of investor protection regime on policy space, the 
settlement of dispute proposed by the SA POI Act appears to raise concerns over its 
effectiveness.455 Literature suggest that most states in the world have signed and 
ratified at least one investment treaty.456 SA is no exception to this for it introduced the 
POI Act in 2015 in response to various challenges amongst which is that BITs pose 
risk and limitations on the ability of government to pursue its constitutional-based 
transformation agenda.457 
In terms of the POI Act, the rights to unilateral recourse to arbitration is preserved 
enabling SA to limit foreign investment dispute settlement to its domestic courts.458 
Section 13 of the Act highlights the processes and procedures for dispute 
settlement.459 This provision starts by availing the investor an opportunity to approach 
the department within six months by which a notice of request must be filed. Upon 
initiating this request, the department appoints a mediator in agreement with the 
investor after exhausting all criteria listed thereafter in the Act. The challenge 
envisaged is the ability of the parties in conflict to commit themselves willingly to finding 
an amicable solution as opposed to subjecting the whole process to an independent 
external judicial body. Prima facie premonition suggest that such exercise may be 
marred by other exogenous factors which include finance, political interference and 
public pressure depending on the sensitivity of the sector involved.460 
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The Act also avails the foreign investor the opportunity to exhaust local remedies for 
recourse. When a resolution cannot be reached and all local remedies have been 
exhausted, the Act compels the investor to seek government consent before 
embarking on arbitration. Chen contends that the quality of the host state’s judiciary is 
important to foreign investors461 which can also translate to according judicial 
independence and legislative oversight on strengthening the quality of local courts.  
Investor-State arbitration was deliberately set aside by the government because it 
believes in the independence and competence of its judicial mechanisms thus section 
13 (4) encourages the use of various judicial institutions within the republic in finding 
recourse to investment disputes. This might turn unpopular among investors because 
investment arbitration over the years has experienced;  
‘Remarkable development bringing the dispute outside the reach of politics with a view 
of ensuring the equalities of the parties in efficient proceedings conducted by 
independent tribunals’.462 
The views expressed by Gazzini further confirms the position of international investors. 
On the other hand proponents of BITs argue that the investor-state arbitration clause 
brings some kind of relief to the investor. Chen suggested that it attempts to remove 
obstacles by delivering via international agreements protection that domestic laws fail 
to adequately guarantee.463 Though in his concluding remarks contended that 
redesigning the BITs to promote institutional reforms (i.e. improve competency in local 
courts) possess a better option for developing nations.464  
It is noteworthy to be reminded that the POI Act wasn’t designed in a mutually 
exclusive manner but in conjunction with section 6, which must be read with section 
13 (4), which expresses the administrative treatment that must be followed.465 
Contrary to traditional BITs like the Canada- Senegal (2014) BIT which opts for either 
ISDS or SSDS, the SA POI recommends that upon the government consent to 
international arbitration, such processes will be guided by Section 6 only when all local 
remedies have been exhausted by the investor. It further states that international 
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arbitration conducted in accordance with the administrative procedures set out in 
Section 6 will be done between the host sate and the home country of the investor 
recognising the State-to-State arbitration as a mechanism that can be explored. It 
barely gives investors room to challenge the sovereignty of domestic institutions but 
leverages through diplomatic channels in matters of international investment 
violations. The SA POI Act herein connotes a deliberate legislative action by the 
government to restructure its investment policy space466 and promoting its 
constitutional-based transformation agenda for the overall benefit of the country. It 
should be mentioned at this point though that one major challenge with this process is 
getting two government to agree to arbitration. The manner by which this is to be 
achieved constitutes a topical issue for further research.   
The concluding analysis shows evidence of similarities in treaty approach to dispute 
settlement by all three BITs subscribing to the ISDS mechanism and the ICSID as their 
choice for judicial recourse. The SSDS is clearly indicated as a choice of arbitration 
between states in the Canada-Senegal (2014) BIT but silent on other BITs under 
investigation. While the ISDS remains the primary mechanism to resolving investment 
dispute, the SA POI Act is resolute on relying on its constitutional provisions 
recommending exhaustion of local remedies within a competent court of jurisdiction.  
This thesis therefore aligns its support with the SA approach by soliciting for African 
States to exhaust local remedies within their host states while independently 
strengthening its judicial institutions to leverage its competences in handling complex 
international investment gridlocks.  
4.4 Chapter Conclusion 
 
Presenting an alternative model or adopting various strategies for resolving 
international investment dispute should be viewed within the framework of the 
constitutional prerogatives of the state. Following careful observations from the 
respective treaties above, it is clear that most African BITs still embrace the OECD 
standard which was designed to give greater protection to the international investor at 
the expense of the host state. South Africa on the other hand have not introduced any 
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new measures out of the ordinary but have relied more upon strengthening its judicial 
institutions by ratifying its constitution to accommodate elements of customary 
international law aimed at protecting the investor and their investments as well as the 
host state. Though certain provisions of the POI Act requires further clarity, the 
anticipated introduction of the new legislation ‘Amendment of Section 25 to allow for 
expropriation without compensation’ will shed more light on the strength of its 
legislative institutions in resolving investment challenges. The true test to this 
prognosis is yet to be determined as the country slowly navigates into the fourth 
industrial revolution.  
The next and final chapter summarises the discourse to establish if indeed BITs 
enhances the protection and promotion of investment in Africa. Concluding comments 
with reference to BITs and other protection instruments will form the basis for future 
recommendations.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter highlights the authors overall findings regarding the primary question of 
this thesis notably ‘The importance of BITs in relation to the protection and promotion 
of investment in Africa’. The main issues of each chapter will be summarised and 
recommendations suggested towards improving the present status quo of African 
BITs.  
5.2 Summary 
 
The abridged thesis gives an overview of the importance of BITs with particular 
emphasis on the protection and promotion clauses of selected African BITs as well as 
the South African Protection of Investment Act as an alternative approach to 
international investment agreements. 
The introductory chapter provided a general overview of the emergence of BITs and 
its importance to the development of States.467 Chapter two went a bit further to 
unbundle the very essence of these BITs. In order to establish this, the author tries to 
investigate specific treatment standard alongside other required provisions in selected 
African BITs that are tasked in promoting and protecting investment in their respective 
treaties.468 The approach culminated in investigating specific problematic clauses 
within their legislative formations, highlighting cases to show the mismatch in standard 
obligations. Further investigations surfaced suggesting if these clauses truly protect 
and promote investment considering the interest of the investor and that of the host 
state. In chapter three, the author took a holistic view on the SA POI Act and it’s 
interlink with various provision of the Constitution of South Africa.469 As the clamour 
for the amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution of South Africa intensified,470 
attention was drawn to the recently proposed Expropriation Bill and its anticipated 
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merits and challenges.471 While evaluating the effectiveness of this piece of legislation, 
it is noteworthy to mention that such an evaluation will be premature and amount to a 
breach in legislative assessment, hence this thesis only considered submissions from 
experts and scholars suggesting the pros and cons and its effect on the South African 
economic landscape.472 Chapter four performed a comparative investigation of 
particular clauses of interest in selected Africa BITs and the SA POI Act in light of their 
individual legislative mandate.473 It then went further to explain the flaws and merits of 
each provision with respect to its legislative framework towards the protection and 
promotion of investment. Dispute settlement mechanisms were discussed as a means 
of providing legitimate recourse to grievances for the overall functioning of the BITs.474 
This is evident in the treaties under investigation subscribing to the ICSID as their 
premier institution of investment arbitration475 while the SA POI Act gave jurisdiction 
to any competent judicial institutions in the republic.476 Chapter five provides a 
summary of the entire campaign on the importance of BIT to the protection and 
promotion of investment in African states and professes alternative methods to further 
improve the legitimacy of existing treaties in light of their sunset clauses. 
5.3 Conclusions from Investigation 
 
At the heart of the discourse on the importance of BITs with particular references to 
the promotion and protection of investment clauses in respective African BITs 
concluded with other developing and developed countries, the following conclusions 
highlighted below expresses the position of this thesis. 
The investigations revealed that certain treatment standards remain problematic due 
to the scope of reference when interpreting its applicability in international investment 
law. For example, defining the terms of reference for the FET and FPS standards 
should be streamlined to provide a sui generis limits to the level of treatment and 
security to be accorded to treaty parties. It is known that arbitration tribunals struggle 
to give precise meaning to these standards thereby resorting to other legal instruments 
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which invariably broaden the scope of the initial meaning. Treaties should however 
spell out what exactly constitute FET while the full protection should be limited to 
‘police protection’ or ‘private protection’ provided, subject to the availability of 
resources available to the host state. The issue of transparency in recent times plays 
an important role in promoting investment. Recent research suggests that the 
transparency clause abounds the level of confidence in investors’ attitude towards 
investing in any given state, provided the level of transparency espouses open public 
hearing and access to information. Therefore consistency in incorporating this 
substantial obligation in treaties improves the desirability of conducting business in the 
host state in accordance with the provisions of customary international law. It also 
provides the investor with some level of confidence and reliability in the judicial system 
of the host state.  
The commitments to ‘promoting investment’ should also be conspicuously 
represented in future treaty textual formations. Investigations from treaties observed 
showed that the word ‘promotion’ was scarcely used as opposed to ‘protection’, which 
was widely used by most treaties. It gives an impression that treaties are primarily 
designed to safeguard the investor instead of finding a balance between the investor’s 
interest and the host state aspirations. Consistent emphasis and representation of this 
word will consciously improve the viability of promoting treaty obligations in 
international investment agreements. 
The approach adopted by the South African government to review its BITs and the 
introduction of the SA POI Act brought a new dimension to international investment 
protection and promotion. Research suggests that the dangers exhibited by the Foresti 
case prompted a drastic change in government attitude towards BITs because it 
encroached on government policy space and more importantly it exposes the 
government’s inability to exercise its sovereign powers over the state. Although South 
Africa’s experience is unique in the sense that it addresses the injustice of the past, it 
continuously takes into consideration the policy direction of the republic and the need 
to guard against any unlawful exploitative tendencies coming from foreign investor. 
The supremacy of the SA Constitution and its overwhelming support for the protection 
and promotion of investment requires treaties to be drafted maintaining an intrinsic 
balance between domestic legislation and customary international law. In so doing, 
the SA POI Act lays emphasis on the supremacy of its legislation beyond any other 
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external legislative instrument, subjecting every foreign investor and investment to be 
compliant with its domestic legislation. It is therefore the opinion of this thesis that 
African countries negotiating BITs should pay more attention to strengthening its 
institutions and focussing on investments that addresses its developmental challenges 
by identifying key elements in the treaties which protect the powers of the state and 
subsequently guard the sovereignty of the state against measures that threatens its 
existence. The interest of the investor must be equally protected with 
recommendations for new measures that seek recourse within the host state before 
concluding BITs with other developing or developed economies. 
A careful examination of the selected African BITs and the SA POI Act suggest that 
both models are designed to promote and protect investments taking into 
consideration the various clauses incorporated in these treaties. The main differences 
are the treatment standards adopted by African BITs i.e. MFN and NT while the SA 
POI opted for only the NT standard. Dispute settlement, a mechanism adopted by all 
treaties, forms the crown for contemporary violations of treaty obligations by the 
investor or the host state. It was quick to identify that all treaty parties are signatories 
to the ICSID and the UNCITRAL Rules notably placing more responsibility to the state 
than the investor. The author therefore suggests that a total review of the dispute 
settlement process be carried out by African Countries in the wake of the challenges 
the ISDS poses to developing countries.  
The option of exhausting local remedies entrenched in the SA POI Act before opting 
for the SSDS process gives both the State and the investor reasonable opportunity to 
resolve disputes domestically or bilaterally through diplomatic channels. Some may 
argue about the inefficiency of the domestic institutions however strengthening of 
these institutions through legislative reforms and capacity building will give more credit 
to these processes. Capacity building which entails providing training courses to re-
skill professionals in matters relating to international investment law cannot be 
excluded. Overhauling the judicial system to be of international standards to be 
impartial and independent will go a long way in helping adjudicating the dispute 
processes. 
Indeed the importance of BITs and the role it plays in international investment law 
cannot be down-played in international investment law discourse however overstating 
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their importance might be too ambitious owning to the fact that treaties are getting less 
attractive as states opt for new models with balanced rights between the host state 
and the impeding interest of the investor.477 Though other factors contribute to the 
development of the state i.e. the strength of the public institutions and the respect for 
the rule of law, the degree of social and political stability and the active role of 
government in promoting a vibrant economy,478 plays a major role in promoting BITs. 
The role of BITs in identifying the investment potential in states is one of the first points 
of reference for most investors seeking safe investment destination. In other words, 
BITs are important however the most important aspect of this legal instrument are the 
provisions it incorporates to protect and promote investment. Africa, represented by 
its diversity and culture, people and other resources must take ownership of its identity 
by first designing its own international investment agreements within the legal 
frameworks of an institutionalised organ that best serve the interest of its people and 
the institutions of the continent as a whole.  
5.4 Recommendations 
 
African states concluding BITs should take into consideration their unique 
circumstances before conceding to adopt BITs as a tool for attracting FDI. They can 
achieve this by adopting new models that permits more elasticity in regulatory space. 
South Africa laid the foundation for that, others should follow suit. BITs must be seen 
from a continental perspective and should be dealt with in that capacity. 
Specific clauses like the MFN and FET standards must be limited in scope with clear 
indicators as to what applies in treaties. The FPS standard also inclusive, must be 
defined within the parameters of the available resources present at the disposal of the 
host state. While the state remains the legitimate provider of law enforcement, latitude 
should be given to the investor to provide additional security to their establishments. 
In essence the FPS in treaties can be phrased as; 
‘Full Protection and Security requires each Party to provide a “level of private security 
to be determined by the state and a level of police protection” as required under 
customary international law.’  
                                                                 
477 Sornarajah M (2017) 213. 
478 Spears S ‘The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International Investment Agreement ’ 
(2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 1047. 
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The sunset clauses which determine the lifespan of the treaties should only be valid 
for the duration of the agreement and not extended beyond the specified timeframe. 
Rather than relying on the ICSID for recourse, each individual African state should 
improve its legislative framework by strengthening its institutions to have the capacity 
to adjudicate on complex investment cases with limited interference from the WB. 
Attesting to this was research done in 2003 by Marry Hallward-Driemeir on FDI 
suggesting that BITs are more likely to be effective when the host state has better 
established legal institutions.479 
Exhausting domestic remedies in terms of dispute settlement, is an ideal model to be 
replicated by African Nations but should be done only if their domestic judicial 
institutions are independently led and equipped with the right resources to match 
international standard. This will give more credibility to the operation, function and 
administration of the institution. After all, the pre-colonial Africa demonstrates a robust 
and vibrant framework for resolving continental dispute.480  
5.5 Final Remarks 
The supremacy of the law and the respect for the rule of law by the host state will deter 
home countries from relying on the ICSID for judicial recourse.481 This is well 
articulated as a reference point in conversations that mitigates the threat of litigation 
from international investors. The sooner Africa develops a comprehensive framework 
that addresses the nascent challenges of its legal systems and respecting the 
provisions of the legal instruments as a whole, the better disposed African countries 
will be in concluding IIAs. 
 
 
 
                                                                 
479 Vandevelde K J ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreement’ (2005) 12 University of 
California Davies Journal of International Law and Policy 185. 
480 Kufuor K O ‘The African Continental Free Trade Agreement and the Importance of a Two-Level 
Approach to its Success’ available at http://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/04/21/the-african-continent al-
free-trade-agreement-and-the-importance-of-a-two-level-approach-to-its-success/# (accessed 23 April  
2019). 
481 Allee T & Peinhardt C ‘Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over 
Dispute Resolution Provision’ (2010) 54 International Studies Quarterly 10. 
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